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Abstract
This is a thesis about time. It is also a thesis about how philosophers
argue about time.
In the first part of the thesis I introduce two key positions in con-
temporary philosophical debate about time: presentism, and eternalism.
Initially I define these competing positions using the standard existence-
oriented definitions one commonly finds in the literature. However, I
later argue that the standard definitions lead to confusion, and suggest
that new definitions based on the notion of concreteness are to be pre-
ferred.
In the second part of the thesis I look at the way that presentism and
eternalism are positioned in the current temporal debate. I note that the
presentist position is considered to be intuitively compelling, but that
eternalism is regarded as being better supported by special relativity. I
examine the place that common-sense has in philosophy, and explain
why presentists continue to argue for their position despite the unam-
biguous scientific (and philosophical) evidence arrayed against it. I sug-
gest that the standard arguments against presentism, while compelling,
are unlikely to move presentists to reject presentism, as they fail to en-
gage with presentism’s underlying motivations.
In the final part of the thesis I argue against the presentist position by
demonstrating that presentism is incompatible with the motivations gen-
erally taken to support it. I look at the way that everyday experience fails
to mesh with presentism’s account of the present, and then ask whether
presentism’s ontology is rich enough to support the arrow of time. In the
vi
end I argue that presentism is unable to support either everyday expe-
rience or a preferred temporal direction, and that presentism should be
rejected as a result.
Note on Navigation
In the electronic version of of this thesis, internal hyperlinks have been in-
serted to facilitate navigation. Citations appear in this blue colour; click-
ing on the blue text will navigate to the relevant entry in the list of refer-
ences. Other internal links appear in this reddish colour; clicking on the
coloured text will navigate to the relevant part of the document. In both
cases issuing a back command will navigate back to the point of origin.
In most .pdf-readers this can be achieved by the key combination Alt +
 .
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CHAPTER ONE
Time Itself
The March Hare took the watch and looked at it
gloomily: then he dipped it into his cup of tea, and
looked at it again...
(LEWIS CARROLL)
1.1 Motivations
I am a procrastinator par excellence: for a number of years I have been
possessed by the pseudo-rebellious/motivational slogan, live in the mo-
ment, with the philosophical twist, for there is nothing else. But the pro-
crastinator’s path is a dark one, and motivational slogans (even catchy
philosophical ones) can lead one astray. Socrates famously said that ’the
unexamined life is not worth living’, and while this has always seemed
a little dogmatic to me it may be the right message when it comes to ex-
orcising the procrastination demon and the seductive metaphysics that
attends it.
Of course, dismissing an enticing (but ultimately mistaken) philo-
sophical thesis is no easy matter. To be genuinely convincing one must
do more than show that the position in question is problematic: one must
aim for the heart and illuminate the underlying (and often unexamined)
motivations that beguile and direct our reasoning. A single philosophi-
cal argument can often be dismissed without trouble, but a philosophical
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thesis is a much more resilient sort of thing. And although rational ar-
guments undoubtedly have psychological force, they seldom have the
psychological force of the theses they claim to support. Presumably part
of the explanation for this is that any particular thesis can be supported
by a multitude of different arguments, so the dismissal of one argument
is seldom a sufficient reason to reject a thesis as a whole. But I think there
is more to it. In a recent article Russell Blackford (2015)1 argues that at
least part of the reason that many philosophical disagreements appear
to be intractable, is that they are born of ‘motivated reasoning’. He cites
both ‘strong preferences for certain conclusions’ and a ‘very broad lati-
tude for disagreement about the evidence’ as potential explanations for
why ‘increasingly sophisticated’ philosophical positions seem unable to
obtain conclusive victories over their rivals. I think that he is on the right
track, and I think this means we need to be smarter about how we do
philosophy.
If our philosophical theses are primarily born of ‘motivated reason-
ing’, and if we hope to make real philosophical progress, then we need to
examine our motivations and their epistemic legitimacy. We need to un-
derstand what it is about particular theses that makes them appeal to us,
and then try and come to some agreement about what sort of evidence
would overcome our preferences for those theses. The point here is pri-
marily a pragmatic one: an argument for (or against) a particular thesis
will be psychologically impotent if it doesn’t engage with our underly-
ingmotivations for holding (or dismissing) that position in the first place.
This is not to suggest that arguments that fail to engage with underlying
motivational issues are pointless or uninteresting; it’s just that they are
less likely to shift the opinions of those already committed to a particu-
lar thesis, and so are less likely to lead to progress in cases of intractable
philosophical dissensus.

1. Following Timothy Williamson (2007).
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The intractable philosophical debate that will be of interest to us here
is one about time. Specifically, it is the debate between the presentists
and the eternalists. The ultimate aim of the thesis is to argue against the
presentist position; but importantly, to do so in a way that engages with
the underlying motivations of the presentists themselves. The thesis is
constructed of four chapters, but has three main parts.
In the first part of the thesis I introduce the key positions in the debate:
presentism and eternalism. Initially I define these competing positions us-
ing the standard existence-oriented definitions one commonly finds in
the literature. However, I later argue that the standard definitions lead
to confusion, and suggest that new definitions based on the notion of
concreteness are to be preferred.
In the second part of the thesis I look at the way that presentism and
eternalism are positioned in the current temporal debate. My primary
interest here is to examine the motivations that underlie presentism, so
that those motivations can be taken into account, and real philosophical
progress can be made. I note that the presentist position is considered
to be intuitively compelling, but that eternalism is generally regarded
as being better supported by science. I examine the place that common-
sense has in philosophy, and suggest that the standard arguments against
presentism, while compelling, are unlikely to move presentists to reject
presentism, as they fail to engage with presentism’s underlying common
sense motivations.
In the final part of the thesis I argue against the presentist position by
demonstrating that presentism is incompatible with the motivations gen-
erally taken to support it. I look at the way that everyday experience fails
to mesh with presentism’s account of the present, and then ask whether
presentism’s ontology is rich enough to support the arrow of time. In the
end I argue that presentism is unable to support either everyday expe-
rience or a preferred temporal direction, and that presentism should be
rejected as a result.
§1.2 PRESENTISM (AND ETERNALISM) 4
1.2 Presentism (and Eternalism)
If there is any theory of time supportive of my brand of procrastination, it
is presentism. Taking the existence of time as a given, presentism is essen-
tially the conjunction of two metaphysical theses. One, that necessarily
the only objects that “really”2 exist are the objects that are temporally
present:
(P1): (8 o)(o has “real00 being ! o is present).
And two, that necessarily the only time that “really” exists is the time
that is temporally present:
(P2): (8 t)(t has “real00 being ! t is present).3
When the second is combined with a reasonable assumption — that
objects exist in or at times — it entails the first.4
In addition to these two essential components, it is traditionally
agreed that presentism is a doctrine that takes tense seriously. By this,
at least three things are meant. Firstly, that presentists consider tensed
2. “Really” exists, because, as Matthew Davidson (2003: 77–78) notes: ‘the presentist
need not say that there are no past and future times, if she takes takes times to be ab-
stract objects. But if she does say that there are abstract past and future times, these
times will have a different status than does the present time. Past, present and future
times all would exist on this view, yet only the present time would be exemplified or
instantiated’. This sort of presentism has become popular recently — see Bourne (2006)
for example — but I find it difficult to see much motivation for holding it. Presentism’s
purported appeal is its common sense simplicity; introducing abstract times is, at least
prima facie, neither commonsensical nor simple.
3. It is not uncommon for participants in the debate about time to focus on only one
of (P1) and (P2), and thus to characterise presentism as being only about time or only
about objects. If we are to restrict ourselves to one of the two then (P2) is the more
important, but there is no reason to restrict ourselves. In fact, I think that in most cases
the failure to characterise presentism as incorporating both (P1) and (P2) is simply an
oversight. A good example of this sort of oversight can be found in Sider (2001: 11),
where eternalism (presentism’s competitor) is characterised as the view that ‘past and
future objects and times are just as real as currently existing ones’, while presentism is
characterised as the view that ‘only currently existing objects are real’ [emphasis mine].
4. Here ‘objects’ should be understood as ‘concrete objects’ (abstract objects are arguably
non spatio-temporal — if they exist at all).
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terms and concepts, such as ‘yesterday’, ‘today’, and ‘tomorrow’, to be
ineliminable from temporal language (and they consider them to be ine-
liminable for ontological reasons). Secondly, that presentists believe time
to be divided by kind; that is, past, present and future are believed to
be ontologically distinct in some fundamental way.5 And thirdly, that
presentists take the directed flow of time (sometimes also referred to as
temporal becoming) to be a“real” phenomenon in the world; that is, they
take the directed flow of time, like the ineliminability of tensed language,
to be grounded in ontology rather than psychology.
One way, and perhaps the best way, of properly understanding
presentism (at least dialectically), is to contrast it with its competitor
eternalism (the view that I will be arguing for in what follows). Where
presentism holds that only present objects “really” exist, eternalism holds
that, in addition to present objects, both past and future objects “really”
exist:
(E1): (8 o)(o has “real00 being ! o is past Y present Y f uture).
And where presentism holds that only the present time “really” ex-
ists, eternalism holds that, in addition to the present time, both past and
future times “really” exist:
(E2): (8 t)(t has “real00 being ! t is past Y present Y f uture).
Here with eternalism, as in the case of (P1) and (P2) with presentism,
when (E2) is combined with the reasonable assumption that objects exist
in or at times, it entails (E1).
Eternalists, unlike presentists, do not, in general, ‘take tense seri-
ously’. Where presentists consider tensed terms and concepts to be in-
eliminable from temporal language for ontological reasons, eternalists
typically consider tensed terms and concepts to be either eliminable or,
if not simply eliminable, then ineliminable for psychological reasons
5. Exactly how this division is characterised will depend on the individual presentist.
Some will make a two-way distinction, others will make a three-way distinction.
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only. Where presentists believe time to be fundamentally divided into
past, present and future, eternalists typically believe time to be a sin-
gle uniform entity with no meaningful ontological divisions. And where
presentists take the directed flow of time to be a “real” or ontologically
grounded phenomenon, eternalists typically take the directed flow of
time to be an “unreal” or purely psychological phenomenon.6
A Real Debate
I think it is clear that presentism and eternalism are competing theo-
ries: they have dramatically different accounts of what (and when) ex-
ists, and how it exists. Recently, however, a number of philosophers
have wondered whether the debate between the presentists and eternal-
ists is a metaphysically substantial one, and whether there is really any
interesting philosophical distinction to be made between the two posi-
tions.7 Philosophers who take this line typically argue that the appar-
ent legitimacy of the debate stems from a misunderstanding of existence,
or perhaps from some relevant equivocation regarding existence. These
philosophers claim that once we properly understand, or firm up, our
notion of existence, the distinctions made between presentism and eter-
nalism will collapse, and the ‘triviality’ or ‘irrelevance’ of the present-
ism/eternalism debate will become apparent.
Mauro Dorato’s (2006) paper, ‘The Irrelevance of the Present-
ist/Eternalist Debate for the Ontology of Minkowski Spacetime’, typifies
this sort of thinking. In it he writes that:
First and foremost among the examples of a misguided meta-
physical use of an apparently meaningful notion is given by
the pseudo-predicate ‘is real’, which, in current philosophy of
time, is very often invoked to create distinctions or debates
6. There are exceptions: Tim Maudlin (2007: Chapter 4), for example, who, while being
an eternalist, takes temporal becoming to be an irreducible ontological feature of time.
7. For more on this see: Callender (2013), Dorato (2006), Crisp (2004a), Crisp (2004b),
Lombard (2010), Ludlow (2004), Meyer (2005), Savitt (2006).
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whose genuinity or clarity, on closer analysis, turns out to be
quite difficult to defend... One of such distinctions is that be-
tween presentists, claiming that only the present ‘is real’, and
eternalists, claiming that the future and past are as real ‘as the
present’. (2006: 93–94)
Dorato goes on to claim that:
...the debate between the so-called presentists and eternalists
either lacks substance or is merely pragmatical. (2006: 93)
...the debate between presentists and eternalists is purely se-
mantical, and has no ontological consequences. (2006: 100)
...the [presentist’s] position cannot be distinguished meaning-
fully from the allegedly opposed one, the eternalist’s.
(2006: 106)
And:
...the debate between the presentists and the eternalists is not
genuine. (2006: 107)
In reaching these conclusions, Dorato makes use of a number of ar-
guments, the most interesting of these being the ‘no contrast class’ ar-
gument. Dorato introduces this argument by considering the claim that
‘the future is real’ — a claim that he takes the eternalists to accept and
the presentists to deny. He then notes, following Austin (1964), that the
expression ‘is real’ in the phrase ‘the future is real’ is an excluder predi-
cate — a predicate that attributes no positive characteristics to its subject,
and instead only attributes negative traits, such as ‘is not imaginary’ or
‘is notmythical’. Given that ‘is real’ operates in this negative way — that
in order to apply, it must be able to exclude — Dorato concludes that for
‘is real’ to be meaningfully applied in the phrase ‘x is real’, it must be the
case that ‘x is real’ has a plausible contrast class, i.e. it must be possible
for the x in question to plausibly fail to be real. Dorato then goes on to
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argue that since there is no plausible contrast class for the claim that ‘the
future is real’, it follows that the debate between the presentists and the
eternalists is meaningless.
I think Dorato’s argument is a little quick. The major problem is that
Dorato fails to account for large parts of the presentist literature. Let me
say a little more about this. Dorato writes that ‘the main trouble raised
by the claim that “the future is real” is that this claim has no [plausible]
contrast class’ (2006: 95). And that there ‘seems to be no plausible way
that the future could be unreal as the presentist has it’ (2006: 96). But this
is not correct. The claim that ‘the future is real’ does have a plausible con-
trast class, several in fact, and it takes only a little looking to find them.
To see that this is so, let us consider some of Dorato’s own examples of
claims where the contrast classes are clear:
We understand the difference between: ‘this is real coffee’ in
contrast to ‘this is a pure surrogate’ (Ersatz), or ‘this is a real
disaster’ in contrast to ‘the problem is not so serious’, or ‘this
is the real color of the painting’, in contrast to ‘this is the sur-
face color’, or ‘this is a real horse’ in contrast to a picture of a
horse. (2006: 95–96)
The last three examples are of no particular interest to us here: time
isn’t something that can be more or less serious; nor does it have a colour
(surface or otherwise); and while we can certainly represent time in a
picture, this isn’t what is at stake in the debate between the presentists
and the eternalists.8 However, Dorato’s first example, the example of
‘real’ and ‘surrogate’ coffee, does hint at one possible contrast class for
the claim that ‘the future is real’ — namely, that the future is ersatz. Do-
rato, I suspect, would not like this contrast class, yet it is one that present-
ists and eternalists frequently make use of. Lewis (1986: 204) for example,
in his seminal On the Plurality of Worlds, considers a view of time where
8. Or at least not exactly, representations of a non-pictorial kind may well play an im-
portant role in the debate.
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past and future times ‘are like false stories; they are abstract representa-
tions, composed out of the materials of the present, which represent or
misrepresent the way things are’. And Crisp (2003: 240) notes a form of
temporal ersatzism, where, like in Lewis’s example, moments of time are
thought of as abstract representations, specifically: ‘abstract representa-
tions of an instantaneous state of the world’. Bourne (2006) also details
(and defends) a version of ‘ersatzer presentism’ where times are abstract
objects. In Bourne’s case, these abstract objects are composed of maxi-
mally consistent sets of propositions, and only one time, the present time,
has a concrete realisation.9
Given the above, I think it’s fair to say that the claim that ‘the future is
real’ does have a plausible contrast class. Here’s one of them: the future
is ersatz. And here’s another: the future is abstract. Not only are these
contrast classes plausible, but they are actively adopted and utilised by
those in the presentist/eternalist debate. (In fact, I think there’s an even
better option in the area, but we’ll come to that later.)
One option that Dorato does consider (before dismissing it as implau-
sible) is that the future fails to be real by failing to exist:
[I]f ‘the reality of the future’ simply means that ‘there will be
events occurring after now’ (what else could it mean?), there
seems to be no plausible way in which the future could be
unreal as the presentist has it, unless we had evidence for the
immediate end of the universe! (2006: 96)
Of course presentists do not typically claim to have evidence for the
immediate end of the universe, but, putting that aside for a moment, the
above passage is revealing in that it indicates that Dorato considers the
non-existence of the future(past) to be the only potentially plausible con-
trast class for the claim that ‘the future(past) is real’. And perhaps this
should not surprise us, for, as Savitt (2006: 112) has noted, ‘in the context
of the presentism/eternalism debate, expressions like “x is real” and “x
9. Similar ersatz accounts of time can be found in Prior (1977)), Zalta (1987), and
Markosian (2004).
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exists” tend to be used interchangeably, even if they diverge in other con-
texts’. Taking Savitt’s report on board, and temporarily ignoring whether
or not ‘is real’ and ‘exists’ should, in fact, be used interchangeably in this
context, why does Dorato go on to claim that his candidate contrast class
— the non-existence of the future — fails to be a plausible contrast class
for the claim that ‘the future is real’, and that ‘there is no contrast class
between a real future and an unreal future’?
It seems to me that Dorato’s purported rejection of the future’s non-
existence as a contrast class for the claim that ‘the future is real’ stems not
from its lack of plausibility as a contrast class— if that were the issue Do-
rato wouldn’t give us the odd, but perfectly meaningful, example of the
universe ending immediately. Rather, Dorato’s rejection stems from his
inability to see how the presentist’s position can be plausibly maintained
(or alternatively distinguished from the eternalist’s position) given this
candidate contrast class. In claiming that ‘there is no contrast class be-
tween a real future and an unreal future’, Dorato silently slips from plau-
sibility in one context — where the issue at stake is the contrast class
for the claim that ‘the future is real’ — to plausibility in a second con-
text — where the issue at stake is the non-equivalence of presentism and
eternalism, or perhaps the plausibility of presentism itself. This slip has
two consequences: firstly, it shows that Dorato’s assertion that ‘the claim
that “the future is real” has no contrast class’ is false — Dorato himself
providing the counterexample. And secondly, it introduces a new line
of argument — one that attempts to show that even if the presentists
and eternalists have been using the term ‘real’ meaningfully, there is no
plausible way of understanding presentism that makes it distinct from
eternalism. Dorato gestures towards this new argument in the following
passage:
I take it...that the presentist cannot be interpreted as denying
that, as of the present moment, the world will have some fu-
ture or other, or equivalently, as affirming that the world will
end after the present moment. If I am right about this, if the
end of the world is not what is at stake...there seems to be no
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genuine ‘contrast class’ between the presentist and the eter-
nalist about the ontological status of the future, i.e. no real
ontological difference between them. (2006: 98)
Here Dorato is not concerned with the plausibility of a contrast class
for the claim that ‘the future is real’, but with the plausibility of present-
ism given that contrast class, or alternatively, with the plausibility of
anymeaningful distinction between presentism and eternalism given that
contrast class. Dorato’s new argument misleadingly references contrast
classes, but is better understood as being concerned with the equivalence
of plausible theories.
The new argument is never fully detailed, but can be interpreted this
way: First, Dorato suggests that the only plausible, i.e. meaningful, con-
trast class for the claim that ‘the future is real’ is that the future is non-
existent. He then argues that if presentists wish to deny that the future
is real, then they must deny that the future exists. For Dorato this de-
nial can take only one form: the assertion that ‘the world will end after
the present moment’. But Dorato considers this assertion absurd, and the
position that advocates it highly implausible — as it is a position that is
‘being constantly refuted by experience’ (2006: 98). Still, he accepts that
a historical precedent for this thesis is to be found in occasionalism, and
cites Descartes, who writes that:
...the nature of time is such that its parts are not mutually de-
pended, and never coexist. Thus, from the fact that we now
exist, it does not follow that we shall exist a moment from
now, unless there is some cause — the same cause which orig-
inally produced us — which continually reproduces us, as it
were, that is to say, which keeps us in existence.10
(1644/1985: 200)
On such an occasionalist view, the world is recreated at every instant,
and each recreated world lasts for only the instant of creation. If these
10. This is a different translation from the one that Dorato cites, however I think it better
illustrates the position in question.
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momentary worlds are not identified as being the same worlds as the
worlds that precede and follow them, and if the future is identified with
persisting latter time-slices of a present world, then the occasionalist-
presentist can deny that the future is real, without also denying that there
will be other times (albeit times at other worlds). However, while Dorato
accepts that this is not an ‘incoherent’ view, he denies that it is plausible
on the grounds that it involves ‘heavy metaphysics’ and that ‘the remedy
seems worse than the disease’ (2006: 98). Having rejected the plausibil-
ity of any version of presentism that requires the world to end after the
present moment (either in a single world or a multi-world scenario), Do-
rato concludes that presentists must believe in the ‘reality of the future’.
He then argues that as eternalists also believe in the ‘reality of the future’
we should admit that presentism and eternalism are ontologically equiv-
alent. And therefore, that ‘the debate between presentists and eternalists
is not genuine’ (2006: 107).
There are three major problems with this argument, each of which
has been foreshadowed above. Firstly, it is not clear that the future be-
ing non-existent is the only plausible contrast class for the claim that ‘the
future is real’, and relatedly, that ‘is real’ should be read as ‘exists’. Sec-
ondly, even if Dorato were right and the future being non-existent was
the only plausible contrast class for the claim that ‘the future is real’, it
is not clear that accepting that the universe will end after the present
moment is ‘refuted by experience’ (though the inductive inference is ad-
mittedly strong). Nor is it entirely clear that it is implausible on other
grounds — physicist Julian Barbour, for instance, in his influential 1999
book, The End of Time, makes use of theWheeler-DeWitt equation to com-
pellingly argue for something very close to multi-world occasionalism.
And thirdly, even if presentists join Dorato in denying that the world
will end after the present moment, and accept that there will be future
times, it is not clear that this commits them to the current existence of
future times. So it is also not clear that the presentist position is equiva-
lent to that of the eternalist, or that the presentist/eternalist debate is not
genuine. I will expand on each of these points below.
§1.2 PRESENTISM (AND ETERNALISM) 13
Dorato suggests that the non-existence of the future is the only plausi-
ble contrast class for the claim that ‘the future is real’, but this is not obvi-
ously correct. While the non-existence of the future does operate as a per-
fectly meaningful contrast class for the claim that ‘the future is real’, indi-
vidually it fails to fully capture the richness of the presentism/eternalism
debate, misclassifying positions that we intuitively want to contrast —
eternalism with ersatzer presentism, for instance. To successfully, or at
least prima facie successfully, capture the distinctions that presentists and
eternalists typically want to make, we must utilise additional or alterna-
tive contrast classes for the claim that ‘the future is real’; such as that the
future is ersatz. And it should be clear that these additional or alterna-
tive contrast classes, can be entirely distinct from the existence-orientated
contrast class offered by Dorato. Consider, for example, the contrast be-
tween a ‘real future’ and an ‘ersatz future’, as used by Bourne and others.
This real/ersatz contrast is distinct from the real/non-existent contrast
that Dorato wishes to make — in that an ersatz future still exists even
while it fails to be real, while a non-existent future fails to be real by failing
to exist. Thus, when Bourne (2006: 54) writes that: ‘ersatzer presentism is
the view not that only one time exists but that only one time has concrete
realization’, and that ‘we must be said to inhabit the concrete realization
of the present time’, before going on to state that this is ‘equivalent to say-
ing that presentists do not believe in any times other than the present’, he
is presenting neither an incoherent view nor a version of eternalism. If
Dorato were right in thinking that the non-existence of the future was
the only contrast class for the claim that ‘the future is real’, then present-
ists like Bourne — who believe that more than one time exists but that
only one time is ‘real’ — would be believing something contradictory.
But this is surely not the case. The non-existence of the future is a fine
contrast class for the claim that ‘the future is real’, but it is not the only
one. Dorato is wrong in thinking that it is, and Savitt is wrong in think-
ing that ‘is real’ and ‘exists’ can be used interchangeably in the temporal
debate. There is more than one contrast class for the claim that ‘the fu-
ture is real’, and ‘is real’ and ‘exists’ have overlapping, but non-identical,
contrast classes — even in the temporal case.
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Earlier I characterized the primary aspects of presentism as:
(P1): (8 o)(o has “real00 being ! o is present),
and
(P2): (8 t)(t has “real00 being ! t is present).
And the primary aspects of eternalism as:
(E1): (8 o)(o has “real00 being ! o is past Y present Y f uture),
and
(E2): (8 t)(t has “real00 being ! t is past Y present Y f uture).
And in doing so I made use of the predicate ‘has “real” being’. But if
‘reality’ and the absence of reality engender confusion through associa-
tions, allusions, and multiple meaningful contrast classes, and straight
existence and non-existence fails to capture the richness of the present-
ist/eternalist debate, how can we best characterise the differences be-
tween presentism and eternalism? Dorato may be mistaken in his as-
sertion that the claim that ‘the future is real’ has no [plausible] contrast
class, but he still raises a hugely important point: ‘real’ is not a univocal
term, and its use in (P1) through to (E2) can only result in confusion.
But if we shouldn’t be asking whether the future(past) times/objects
are real or not, or whether future(past) times/objects exist or not, what
should we be asking? The answer: ‘real being’ amounts to concrete-
ness and thus the question we should be asking is whether future(past)
times/objects are concrete or not. (Or alternatively, whether the fu-
ture(past) times/objects are concretely realized or not.) If I am right, ‘real
being’, as it is used above, will amount to being concrete, and when
presentists and eternalists are asked whether future(past) times/objects
are concrete, eternalists will answer ‘yes’ and presentists will answer ‘no’.
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This way of delineating presentism and eternalism has several ben-
efits, but also a drawback — though I think the drawback is not insur-
mountable. Let’s begin with the drawback. As Lewis (1986: 81) notes:
‘it is not at all clear what philosophers mean when they speak of “con-
crete” and “abstract”’. But if philosophers are unclear about what they
mean when they use the term ‘concrete’, then they may be unable to
distinguish between those things that are concrete and those things that
are non-concrete. And if they are unable to reliably make this distinc-
tion, then they will be unable to answer whether they believe that fu-
ture(past) times/objects are concrete or not. Luckily, despite some vague-
ness around the terms, I think philosophers have enough of an idea about
what counts as concrete andwhat counts as non-concrete to be able to an-
swer the question in the temporal case.
Lewis himself notes four ways that we might be able to distinguish
between concrete and abstract. He calls these: the Way of Example, the
Way of Conflation, the Negative Way, and the Way of Abstraction. The
most interesting of these for our present purposes is the Way of Example.
On the Way of Example, Lewis writes:
[C]oncrete entities are things like donkeys and puddles and
protons and stars, whereas abstract entities are things like
numbers. (1986: 82)
He goes on to complain that this ‘gives us very little guidance’ as we
don’t have an uncontroversial account of what numbers are, and that
even if we did have such an account, there are just too many ways that
numbers differ from paradigm concrete entities like donkeys. He also
complains that even if we know that numbers are abstract and that don-
keys are concrete, we still don’t know where to place the boundary be-
tween them. That is, even if we know that some things are abstract and
that some things are concrete, we still don’t know where the line that
divides the abstract from the concrete lies.
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I think there are several things we can say in response to Lewis’s wor-
ries regarding the distinction — at least with respect to its use in the tem-
poral case. The first of these is that the Way of Example doesn’t need to
give us much in the way of guidance, so the fact that it gives us ‘very
little’ is not a problem — very little is all we need. What the Way of
Example offers is not a specific method of ascertaining whether or not
something is abstract or concrete, nor is it a criterion of abstractness and
concreteness; rather it is a reminder of a distinction that we already have
a good intuitive grasp on. Lewis worries that we don’t have an uncontro-
versial account of what numbers are, and wonders how, in light of this,
we can say whether they are concrete or abstract. I suggest that whatever
our final theory of numbers comes to, we will, on learning of it, be able to
tell whether numbers are abstract or not.11 The Way of Example assists
us by reminding us of the distinction, not by dictating it.
The real problem with the abstract/concrete distinction is not that
we’re unable to reliably make use of it (we are), nor that there is
widespread disagreement about specific cases of use (there isn’t), but
rather, that we don’t knowwhether the distinction is fundamental or not.
It might well be the case that the abstract/concrete distinction can be re-
duced to some other more fundamental distinction— such as the distinc-
tion between those things that are causally efficacious and those things
that are not — and the Way of Example will not help us here. Still, I don’t
think our uncertainty about the distinction’s fundamentality need be a
problem for those who wish to use the distinction in the temporal case.
Even if we don’t know what ultimately underlies the abstract/concrete
distinction, as long as we are sure that it is a robust ontological distinc-
tion, and that it is one that we can reliably make, we are free to use it
when we compare the present time with past and future times.
Lewis’s second worry is that even if we are able to distinguish be-
tween abstract numbers and concrete donkeys, the Way of Example will
11. Lewis may be right when he worries that numbers are too controversial to act as
paradigm examples of abstract objects, however, this is not a problem with the Way of
Example itself, instead it is a problem with the examples selected.
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not tell us where the line between the abstract and the concrete lies.
Again, I do not think this will be a problem for those who wish to use the
distinction in the temporal case. There are two reasons for this. The first
is that the abstract/concrete distinction involves a dichotomy and not
a continuum; and so it gives us no ontologically or linguistically vague
cases. As a result, as long as our intuitions are working correctly we
should be able to ascertain whether something is concrete or abstract in
any given case. The second reason is that even if there are some epistemi-
cally vague cases, i.e. cases where we are unsure as to whether something
is concrete or abstract, these cases are not relevant in the debate between
the presentists and the eternalists. Simply put, there is no uncertainty
in the presentism/eternalism debate, there is only disagreement. For the
presentists and eternalists the importance of the concrete/abstract dis-
tinction is in comparing the present time with past and future times. It
is agreed by (almost) all parties that the present time is either concrete
or concretely realized, and the important question is whether or not past
and future times are concrete, or concretely realized, as well. The eter-
nalists will say that they are, and the presentists will say that they are
not.
It should also be noted that for the presentists and the eternalists the
distinction that is of interest here is not the distinction between concrete
times and abstract times, but instead the distinction between concrete
times and non-concrete times. While the presentists might well assert
that past and future times/objects are abstract, the importance of this
— at least as far as the formulation of the debate goes — is that if the
presentists are right, then their assertion also entails that past and future
times/objects are non-concrete. This brings us to the advantages of de-
lineating presentism and eternalism along concrete/non-concrete lines.
Dorato suggests that the only plausible, i.e. meaningful, contrast class
for the claim that ‘the future is real’ is that the future is non-existent. As I
have argued above, this is incorrect: there are other equally plausible con-
trast classes for the claim that ‘the future is real’ — such as that the future
is ersatz. However, Dorato’s mistake raises an important point: if we put
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the differences between presentism and eternalism in terms of what is
real, we court confusion. ‘Reality’ it seems, is not a univocal notion. And
while ‘existence’ might well be a univocal notion, it cannot capture the
intricacies of the presentism/eternalism debate without augmentation.12
‘Concreteness’, as it is used in philosophy, is also a univocal notion, so no
confusion is generated whenwe put the presentism/eternalism debate in
terms of it, but additionally, ‘concreteness’ captures the important differ-
ences between presentism and eternalism without augmentation. It does
this through existential entailment and a relevant catch-all contrast class.
What do I mean by this? Well, if it is true that the present time is concrete,
then it is true that the present time exists. Similarly, if it is true that past
and future times are concrete, then it is true that past and future times
exist. The concreteness of something guarantees its existence, and the
truth that the thing is concrete guarantees the truth that it exists.13 On
the other hand, if past and future times are non-concrete, then it is not
necessarily the case that they fail to exist, though of course they might.
This combination of guaranteed existence in the case of concreteness, and
existential flexibility in the case of its contrast class — non-concreteness—
allows concreteness to capture the richness of the presentism/eternalism
debate in its entirety. The concrete/non-concrete distinction gives us
what presentists and eternalists have hoped to convey when they have
previously used the term ’real’ in relation to the temporal debate — and
it does so without the confusion that the term ’real’ creates.
12. It might also be argued that, in fact, ‘existence’ is no clearer a notion than ‘reality’. If
one is a Meinongian about existence, for instance, one will believe in many more things
than if one is not a Meinongian about existence. A Meinongian presentist might well
believe in the existence of future times, while still wanting to distinguish their view
from the view of the eternalists.
13. ‘Entailment’, traditionally understood, is a necessitation relation holding between
propositions, or perhaps other representational entities — though as Heil (2003: 63)
notes, we may also think that such a relation also holds between objects, where it will
mirror the entailment relation that holds between propositions and other representa-
tions. ‘Existential entailment’, as I am using the term here, is a necessitation relation
that holds between both representational and non-representational entities. It can be
understood as a relation that necessitates the truth of an appropriate existence claim, or
as a necessitation relation that holds between certain properties of an object, and the ob-
ject itself. If an object is ‘existentially entailed’ then the existence of that object is entailed
by some property that the object possesses.
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1.3 Positioning
So, before we move on to the next chapter, let’s update and recap.
Presentism is best characterised as the view that:
(P1*): (8 o)(o has concrete being ! o is present),
and
(P2*): (8 t)(t has concrete being ! t is present).
And eternalism is best characterised as the view that:
(E1*): (8 o)(o has concrete being ! o is past Y present Y f uture),
and
(E2*): (8 t)(t has concrete being ! t is past Y present Y f uture).
Additionally, presentists take tense (ontologically) seriously —where
eternalists typically do not; maintain that there are fundamental divisions
between past, present, and future — where eternalists typically do not;
and believe in an ontologically grounded flow of time — where eternal-
ists typically do not.14
It is perhaps unsurprising then, that of the two theories of time it is
presentism that is said to be the commonsensical theory, or the intuitive
theory, or the theory supported by the phenomenological evidence, and
this is widely considered to be a significant (and motivating) point in
presentism’s favour. After all, time certainly seems to be tensed, it cer-
tainly seems to be divided, it certainly seems to exhibit a directed flow!
Presentist, William Lane Craig, drives the third of these intuitions home
with rhetorical force, when he writes that:
14. In a sense, the issues of tense, division, and flow can be considered orthogonal to
the issue of concreteness and non-concreteness. However, there is a natural clustering
of the views, and presentism and eternalism are almost always presented as package
views — see Garrett (2011: 91) for a good example of this sort of packaging.
§1.3 POSITIONING 20
It is hard to think of anything that is more evident to us than
the fact of temporal becoming. It is as obvious as the exis-
tence of the external world. For we experience that world,
not as a static tableau, but as a continual flux, as a tensed
world... Some of our thoughts are now past, we are aware
of our present mental experience, and we anticipate that we
shall think new thoughts in the future. And there is no ar-
resting of this flux of experience; there is constant and in-
eluctable becoming... If the experience of temporal becoming
is an illusion, if in reality there is no such thing as [ontologi-
cally grounded] temporal becoming, then it is hard to imagine
what is left to us about which we should not be sceptical.
(2001: 159)
This point will prove important, so it is worth reiterating: philosophers
often characterise the presentist position as the most intuitively com-
pelling, and therefore default, option amongst theories of time. Present-
ism, we are often told, is the common sense or intuitive theory of time.
It is the theory of time supposedly supported by the phenomenological
evidence, and this is seen to be a significant point in presentism’s favour.
Quentin Smith (2002: 119), for instance, regards presentism as intuitively
obvious, and finds it hard to understand how anyone could think oth-
erwise. Ned Markosian (2004: 48), following Hilary Putnam (1967: 240),
suggests that presentism is the theory of time ‘that the average person on
the street would accept’. John Bigelow (1996: 35-36), goes even further,
arguing not only that presentism is the commonsensical view of time,
but also that up until the beginning of the nineteenth century presentism
was considered as obviously true by all who troubled themselves to think
about it. Even Ted Sider, an unrepentant eternalist, notes that ‘[present-
ism’s] guiding intuition is compelling’ (2001: 11). And Barry Dainton,
another eternalist, writes that the ‘appealing’ and ‘natural’ view of time
is something like the presentist one, where only the constantly advancing
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present is seen as fully real (2001: 28).15 And, on the face of it, present-
ism is a tempting doctrine. It seems to accord with common sense, com-
mon experience, and the commonly advocated methodological principle
of parsimony (presentism requires only one concrete time, whereas eter-
nalism requires infinitely many equally concrete times). Unfortunately
things are not always as they seem: presentism is a philosophical suc-
cubus and its charms are illusory.
When closely scrutinised, presentism fails to deliver; its initial appear-
ances aremisleading: it is neither consistently supported by intuition, nor
consistently supported by phenomenology. And this, I will argue, should
give us reason to expel presentism from the default position. Instead we
(and particularly current card-carrying presentists) should, and from a
safe cognitive distance, subject presentism to a thorough and critical ex-
amination: is presentism internally consistent, is it supported by our best
science, does it mesh with our other philosophical theories? Only if we
are convinced of its appeal then, should we submit to its seduction. But
I do not believe that we will submit, because presentism’s initial appear-
ances are misleading, and the relationship between presentism and the
motivations that underlie it are more complex, and troublesome, than
they first appear.
15. This is important: as things stand at the moment, both presentists and eternalists
consider presentism to be the commonsensical option.
CHAPTER TWO
Common Sense about Time
2.1 History and Role
Common sense plays a vital role in our everyday lives; it dictates many of
our beliefs and informs many of our actions. When we trust our senses
and affirm the existence of an external world we do so on the grounds
of common sense. Likewise, when we exit a building by the front door,
rather than a window on the second floor, we do so because common
sense tells us that it is the right thing to do.16
Sometimes, of course, common sense gets things wrong. History
abounds with pertinent examples — the sun does not circle a stationary
earth; the elephant is more closely related to the rock hyrax than to the
rhinoceros; and when flipping a coin, getting fifty tails in a row does not
increase the probability of getting tails on the next flip — and yet, in gen-
eral, we are unfazed by such examples. The occasional failure of common
sense does not prevent us from using it as either a source of evidence or
in justifying our beliefs. As Jacob Joshua Ross has noted: ‘in everyday
arguments we often meet with such phrases as “that’s rational, it’s mere
common sense” used in conjunction to approve or back up some par-
ticular statement’ (1978: 374). I would go even further, suggesting that
in everyday argument the assertion that something is ‘simply common
16. With thanks to Tim Minchin.
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sense’ is frequently akin to the affirmation that something is ‘true’, and
obviously so.
It is not only in everyday argument that an attribution of common
sense is taken to be a commendation; common sense is considered a
virtue in philosophy as well. Indeed entire philosophical movements
have taken common sense as both their foundation and touchstone:
most notably the Common Sense Realists of the Scottish Enlightenment,
Thomas Reid, George Campbell, James Beattie, and Dugold Stewert et
al.; and the American Pragmatists, particularly Charles S. Peirce. In the
Analytic tradition too, common sense has had significant influence: most
famously in the work of G.E. Moore but also, arguably, in later Wittgen-
stein and the Natural Language philosophers. Today “common sense”
of various forms continues to be championed by George Bealer, William
Lycan, Brian Grant, and Steven D. Hales, among many others. And if
common sense is not always taken to be a guarantee of truth in philos-
ophy — as it often is in everyday life — then theories that accord with
common sense are still, generally, considered to be better off than those
that do not. Craig Bourne in his (2006) A Future for Presentism, writing on
the ‘requirements of a good philosophical theory’, and under the heading
‘Common Sense’, captures what I see as the philosophical orthodoxy on
the matter when he notes that:
Any good theory will accord as far as possible with intuition.
‘Intuition’ is not meant to be understood as unthinking preju-
dice, but rather to capture the views of an independent sensi-
ble person, where ‘independent’ means someone who has not
been spoiled by a theory that for some reason— it’s their own
baby, or it makes them quirky and stand out from the crowd
— they’d like to defend... [We] require intuition, in this sense,
to be respected... (2006: 14–15)
Stronger, but in much the same vein, Mark Kingwell writes:
Metaphysical systems may bring on themselves all manner of
tortuous apparatus and system machinery in a drive to say
how things really stand, but if they do not, at some level,
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begin with how things commonsensically stand, they are no
good even as metaphysics. (1995: 175)
Bourne’s and Kingwell’s statements point towards at least three roles
that common sense can (and frequently does) play in philosophy. Firstly,
common sense can act as a foundation for philosophy: both in an epis-
temic sense, as the foundation for our basic beliefs; and also in a practical
sense, as the foundation, or starting point, for our philosophical investi-
gations. Secondly, and relatedly, common sense can act as an important
motivator in philosophy. So, for example, if common sense tells us time is
directed, then we will be motivated to believe that time is directed, and
also, to defend the thesis that time is directed. In both its foundational
and motivational roles common sense may be combined with the prin-
ciple of conservatism17 to provide an initial justification, and defence, of
the commonsensical position in question — in this case, that time is di-
rected. David Lewis seems to advocate this union of conservatism and
common sense when he writes that:
...theoretical conservatism is the only sensible policy for theo-
rists of limited powers, who are duly modest about what they
could accomplish after a fresh start. Part of this conservatism
is reluctance to accept theories that fly in the face of common
sense... A worthwhile theory must be credible, and a credible
theory must be conservative. It cannot gain, and it cannot de-
serve, credence if it disagrees too much with what we thought
before. And much of what we thought before was just com-
mon sense. (1986: 134)
This leads us to the third role that common sense can play in philoso-
phy: the role of a touchstone, to be used in the evaluation of philosophical
theories. When used this way the pronouncements of common sense are
compared against those of a target philosophical theory to help ascer-
tain that theory’s value. For a philosophical theory to have a significant
17. The principle of conservatism says that when a person has an initial belief, then that
person is, to some degree, justified in retaining that belief. For more on the principle of
conservatism see: Chris Daly (2010: 20).
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level of accordance with common sense is considered to be a desirable
feature — and in some circumstances may even be thought of as a neces-
sary, though seldom sufficient, condition for the adequacy of the theory.
In contrast, the failure to obtain a significant degree of accordance with
common sense may be seen a major blow against a theory.
2.2 Varieties of Common Sense
That common sense is widely respected in philosophy should not be
taken to mean that everything that gets called ‘common sense’ in ev-
eryday life carries weight in philosophy, however. Clearly not. In non-
philosophical use (and indeed in philosophical use as well) the term
‘common sense’ can be used to mean a great number of different things,
and in several of its everyday uses those things that are referred to as
‘common sense’ can, as Mark Kingwell notes, be more accurately de-
scribed as ‘common nonsense’:
...the tenets of folk wisdom, fishwives’ tales, traditional reme-
dies, received lore, and the like. With no disrespect to fish-
wives, much of what passes for sense in this realm is, and has
been shown to be, false: and whatever else is true about com-
mon sense, it must not be known to be false. (1995: 170)
Evaluating a philosophical theory by comparing it against fishwives’
tales will score you no philosophical points — unless, of course, the the-
ory is actually about fishwives’ tales. (And if a theory aiming at truth
is in accordance with something known to be false, then that accordance
can hardly be considered desirable, irrespective of whether that theory
is a philosophical theory or not.) However, while the “common sense”
of philosophy is perhaps more restricted than truly common “common
sense”, it is not so divergent from it that it is unrecognisable. And cer-
tainly, what is referred to as common sense within the philosophical com-
munity is at least as varied as what gets called common sense in everyday
discourse. In philosophy it can sometimes be tempting to demand that
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every term be defined clearly and in a univocal manner, but to do so with
‘common sense’ would be to ignore the diversity of meanings present in
actual current philosophical practice — and indeed the fluidity and criti-
cal imprecision of common sense itself.
Among the various different notions that are frequently admitted un-
der the general umbrella of common sense (within philosophy), we can
include at least the following:
 Common opinion or belief — ‘I endorse Presentism, which, it
seems to me, is the “common sense” view, i.e. the one that the av-
erage person on the street would accept’ (Markosian, 2004: 48).
 Intuitions — ‘Presentism is intuitive. It is an explication of our
common sense view’ (Göcke, 2014: 64).
 Naturalness — ‘Common sense tells us something like this: only
the present is fully real... Call it the “natural view”’ (Dainton,
2001: 28).
Other potential candidates include basic beliefs or assumptions, clear and
distinct seemings, Moorean truths, and so on. In practice these (and the
above) notions are not wholly independent — there are various connec-
tions and interactions between them. What’s more, many of these terms
are, themselves, used in multiple distinct, and at times conflicting, ways
—which can occasionally lead to disagreement about what sort of things
count as philosophical common sense.
Empirical Intuition and Rational Intuition
Of all of the various notions clustered under the label of philosophical
common sense, intuition is perhaps the most important — and also the
most controversial. Opinions about what counts as intuition are diverse,
and there is a notable division between those who treat intuition as a
variety of common sense (like Bourne) and those who regard intuition
and common sense as being entirely distinct.
§2.2 VARIETIES OF COMMON SENSE 27
William Lycan, with impressive cynicism and rhetorical drive, has the
following to say about intuition:
We may wonder where metaphysical premises (often called
‘intuitions’) come from. Are they deliverances of the lumen
naturale? Does the Third Eye of the metaphysician’s mind get
a rare look at a Platonic Form? Perhaps they just articulate
features of our ordinary ways of conceiving certain things.
Whatever; their epistemic credentials are obscure, and more
importantly, they are shoddy. A metaphysician who claims
to ‘just know’ that such an abstract premise is true (‘This is a
deep intuition’) cannot be taken very seriously. (2001: 40)
Yet of common sense, he writes:
No purely philosophical premise can ever (legitimately) have as
strong a claim to our allegiance as can a humble common-
sense proposition. (2001: 41)
The distinction being made here, is between what is sometimes called
empirical intuition (or “common sense”) and rational intuition (or the pure
light of reason). Lycan is happy enough with empirical intuition — em-
pirical intuition is the realm of the everyday; it deals with contingent
matters and is integral to, and testable by, science. But he is deeply
unimpressed by the rational intuition of metaphysics — which science
is unable to get a hold on. ‘Science’, he writes, ‘can correct common
sense; metaphysics and philosophical “intuition” can only throw spit-
balls’ (2001: 41).
Steven D. Hales, like Lycan, supports the divide between empirical
and rational intuition, but where Lycan is happy with the empirical and
dismissive of the rational, Hales, for very similar reasons, supports the
rational and rejects the empirical. The deliverances of empirical intuition
have been ‘laid to waste by science’ he thinks, but philosophy is (thank-
fully) safe because:
Philosophers do not rely on this sort of intuition... Our intu-
ition is rational, not empirical; it is the pure light of reason that
shines upon necessary propositions. (2000: 135)
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Unlike Lycan and Hales, I am not convinced that the distinction be-
tween rational intuition and empirical intuition (or “intuition” and “com-
mon sense”) is either methodologically or philosophically revealing. In-
deed, I find the distinction between the two rather worrying: not least
because it may be thought to draw what I see as an inaccurate, and po-
tentially damaging, line between philosophy and science. This line is
suggested, for example, by Hales’ insistence that philosophy uses a dif-
ferent sort of intuition to the intuition utilised and assessed by science;
and by Lycan’s praise of scientifically acceptable “common sense” com-
bined with his sardonic dismissal of metaphysical “intuition”.
I believe that philosophy and science are, at least in some sense, in-
terdependent; I believe that they are, at least to some degree, concep-
tually and methodologically intertwined. If Lycan and Hales are cor-
rect though, the “intuition” that is used in philosophy (and especially
in metaphysics) is distinct from the “common sense” that is used, and
assessed, by science. They are different sorts of things, and should not
be combined. One might argue, I suppose, that while the subject matters
of philosophy and science partially overlap (and this should be no sur-
prise given that modern science was born out of natural philosophy), the
methodology of philosophy and science are still significantly removed
from one another — as is clearly demonstrated by the differences be-
tween a philosopher’s study and a scientist’s lab. And indeed there is
some truth in this; yet I think it is clear that whatever methodological
differences there are, they do not consist in a division between “common
sense” and “rational intuition”. It is just not the case that science uses
one sort of thing: “common sense”; and philosophy uses another: “ra-
tional intuition”. If “common sense” and “rational intuition” are truly
different sorts of things (and I am not convinced that they are), then phi-
losophy and science both use both of them. They also both misuse both of
them. This doesn’t show that empirical and rational intuition cannot be
separated, of course, but it does remove one motivation for making the
distinction in the first place.
§2.2 VARIETIES OF COMMON SENSE 29
In the previous chapter I quoted William Lane Craig. Let me quote
him again here for easy reference:
It is hard to think of anything that is more evident to us than
the fact of temporal becoming. It is as obvious as the exis-
tence of the external world. For we experience that world,
not as a static tableau, but as a continual flux, as a tensed
world... Some of our thoughts are now past, we are aware
of our present mental experience, and we anticipate that we
shall think new thoughts in the future. And there is no ar-
resting of this flux of experience; there is constant and in-
eluctable becoming... If the experience of temporal becoming
is an illusion, if in reality there is no such thing as [ontologi-
cally grounded] temporal becoming, then it is hard to imagine
what is left to us about which we should not be sceptical.
(2001: 159)
Now compare his thoughts with those of physicist Paul Davies:
As a physicist, I am well aware how much intuition can lead
us astray... Yet as a human being, I find it impossible to relin-
quish the sensation of a flowing time and a moving present
moment. It is something so basic to my experience of the
world that I am repelled by the claim that it is only an illu-
sion or misperception. It seems to me that there is an aspect
of time of great significance that we have so far overlooked in
our description of the physical universe.
(Davies, 1995: 275, as cited in Dainton, 2001: 93)
The intuition here, that time flows, is clearly shared by Craig and
Davies; and what’s more, it appears to be doing the same job for each
of them. Earlier I suggested that common sense can play at least three
roles in philosophy; that it can act as a foundation, amotivator, and a touch-
stone. I now want to suggest that intuition can, and sometimes does, play
the same roles in scientific inquiry. Both Craig and Davies take the intu-
ition that time flows to be foundational; they are using it as the starting
point of their enquiry. They are also motivated by the intuition. That is,
they think that the intuition is telling them something important about
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the nature of time — and they believe what it is telling them. They are
motivated to defend the view that time flows. Finally, they are using
the intuition as a touchstone; they are arguing that any theory that fails
to accommodate it — and to accommodate it in a fairly straightforward
manner — is deficient in some respect.
So, is Craig and Davies’ intuition, the intuition that time flows, empir-
ical or rational? If it is empirical, then it seems, contra Hales, that philos-
ophy makes use of empirical intuition. If it is rational, then it seems that
science is interested in more than what is obviously testable. Either way,
the distinction between empirical intuition and rational intuition neither
results in, nor can it be considered the result of, some corresponding divi-
sion between science and philosophy. One could still maintain that intu-
ition and common sense are entirely different sorts of things, but if they
are, they are not separated by a clean methodological divide between
philosophy and science. Such a line fails to accurately reflect the actual
use of intuition in both philosophy and science.
In fact, I think that it is not at all clear whether the intuition that time
flows is empirical or rational. On the one hand, the intuition is informed
by our everyday experience of time; it is not a priori — and this suggests
that it is empirical. On the other hand, if time does flow, then it is not
unreasonable to think that it flows necessarily — and this suggests that
it is rational. But if the intuition is neither obviously empirical, nor ob-
viously rational, then it looks like the distinction is in trouble; and if that
distinction is in trouble, then the distinction between rational intuition
and empirical intuition looks equally shaky. Given this, I am inclined
to think that intuition is best thought of as being of a singular type —
though it may be directed at a wide variety of targets — and that Bourne
is correct in regarding intuition (generally) as a species of philosophical
common sense. In any case, in what follows I will be treating it as such,
and will be using the terms ‘intuition’ and ‘common sense’ pretty much
interchangeably.
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2.3 Motivations (Again)
Whilemany people are impressed by the apparent common sense aspects
of presentism, there are comparatively few presentists. One reason for
this is the fundamental clash between presentism and special relativity, as
originally argued for by Hillary Putnam in his Time and Physical Geometry
(1967). An outline of the argument is presented below:18
Presentism holds that if any two things are present, then those
two things are simultaneous with one another. But special rel-
ativity tells us that whether or not two things, A and B, are
simultaneous with one another, depends upon the reference
frame from which A and B are viewed. From one frame of
referenceA and Bwill be seen to be simultaneous, while from
another frame of reference A and B will be seen to be tem-
porally divergent. What’s more, special relativity tells us that
there is no one particular frame of reference that is more fun-
damental than any other, and thus there is no clear candi-
date for an ontologically privileged present — something that
presentism and other tensed theories of time clearly require.
If there is to be a “present” at all then, this present must be rel-
ative rather than absolute. For presentism this means that the
concreteness of objects and events will be relative rather than
absolute. And this is not an acceptable consequence. As a re-
sult, either special relativity, or presentism, (or both) must be
rejected.
The usual (and in this case I think correct) course of action, is to reject
presentism: special relativity is one of our most successful scientific theo-
ries, while presentism is a philosophical theory plaguedwith problems.19
Besides, as Sider (2001: 42) has noted: ‘in cases of science verses meta-
physics, historically the smart money has been on science’. But while
18. Adjusted slightly from the original argument to fit better with my preferred way
of delineating presentism and eternalism (using the concrete/non-concrete distinction
discussed in §1.2).
19. For some problems with presentism see: Crisp (2003) and (2007), Dainton (2001),
Davidson (2003), Meyer (2005), Mellor (1998), Sider (1999) and (2001), Tallent (2011),
and Tooley (1997), among others.
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many of those who are initially impressed by the apparent common sense
appeal of presentism reject presentism when faced with Putnam’s argu-
ment, there are also those who hold on to their common sense intuitions,
and instead reject special relativity. These presentists typically argue that
just because special relativity fails to specify an ontologically privileged
present, we should not think that there isn’t such a thing; or that, for
any philosophically rich scientific theory that clashes with common sense
(such as special relativity), there will be an equally good, and less philo-
sophically rich theory (call it special relativity*), that meshes with common
sense.20 However, as Katherine Hawley puts it, many feel that ‘this is just
so much squirming, and that presentists should simply face up to the fact
that their theory, though it might initially have seemed appealing, has
been rendered untenable by scientific progress’ (2006: 451-452).
So why is it that presentists remain unconvinced by Putnam’s argu-
ment? The answer, I think, comes back to a point I made earlier: For an
argument for (or against) a particular thesis to be psychologically com-
pelling, it must engage with the underlying motivations for holding (or
dismissing) that thesis in the first place. But Putnam’s argument fails
to engage with presentism’s underlying motivations, so it fails to con-
vince those who are not already inclined towards the argument’s sup-
posed anti-presentist conclusions. Presentism is primarily motivated by
common sense — it is, we are told, ‘an explication of our common sense
view’ (Göcke, 2014: 64). And although Putnam’s argument establishes
special relativity’s incompatibility with presentism, by itself this gives us
no reason to prefer the deliverances of science to to those of common
sense, and so gives us no reason to prefer special relativity to presentism.
As Lycan (2001: 39) reminds us, in philosophy (and in other disciplines
as well), a logical argument is nothing more than an invitation to com-
pare the plausibility of a set of premises and a conclusion. And presentists
simply find presentism more plausible than special relativity.21
20. See: Tooley (1997), Hinchliff (2000); Markosian (2004); and Bourne (2006).
21. As Bourne (2006: 185) writes, ‘The best way for a tense theorist [like a presentist]
to reconcile tense theory with STR [special relativity] is not tamper with either tense or
§2.3 MOTIVATIONS (AGAIN) 33
The position that presentists find themselves in is akin to the position
that all philosophers find themselves in when faced with global scepti-
cism. No one can deny the enormous power of the canonical sceptical
arguments, yet none of us are truly sceptics (though we may occasion-
ally pretend otherwise). This is because scepticism is wrong. Obviously,
commonsensically wrong. Likewise, no one can deny the amazing success
of science, but, the presentist will say, special relativity must be missing
something, because presentism is the correct theory of time. Common
sense tells us so.
If I am right, and this is the position that presentists find themselves
in, then no direct argument against presentism will move a presentist
to reject presentism; such tactics are pointless. Presentists will only be
persuaded to reject presentism if presentism can be shown to be incom-
patible with common sense, or common intuition, or perhaps phenom-
enal experience. It must be shown that the move from common sense
to presentism is illegitimate, and that presentism is incompatible with
the motivations that are generally taken to support it. Anything short of
this will be psychologically impotent, and the presentism/eternalism de-
bate will continue to be nothing more than an intractable philosophical
dissensus. Accordingly, in the remainder of this paper, I will show not
that presentism is false, but rather that presentism is deceptive, and that
presentists and eternalists alike have been universally mistaken when
they have taken common sense to support presentism. Presentism has
long been thought to be the common sense theory of time. It’s time that
changed.
STR as traditionally understood. But something needs to give’. When push comes to
shove, presentists will reject special relativity as it is traditionally understood (Bourne
recommends that we reject Einstein’s characterization of simultaneity).
CHAPTER THREE
Extended Experience and Presentism
3.1 The Present
In demonstrating how questionable the charms of presentism really are,
it will be useful to develop a more precise picture of one of presentism’s
key notions. Specifically, it will be useful to pin down a definition for
‘the present’ with respect to duration. Surprisingly, despite the longevity
of the presentist debate, and the significant attention that the presentist
position has garnered, very little has been said about this essential matter
(at least by the presentists themselves). Rather, presentists have been
largely content to characterise the present in loose or intuitive terms. But
as we shall see, a great deal rests on exactly how the present is conceived.
Historically, there have been two important ways that the present has
been conceived: as instantaneous, and as extended. The instantaneous
conception of the present was famously defended by Aristotle and Au-
gustine, while the extended conception of the present has been defended
by William James and an early C. D. Broad, among others. I will look at
each of these conceptions of the present in turn, starting with the instan-
taneous present, as it is characterised by Augustine.
Augustine, in his Confessions, writes that:
If we can think of some bit of time which cannot be divided
into even the smallest instantaneous moments, that alone is
what is what we can call ‘present’. And this time flies so
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quickly from future into past that it is an interval with no du-
ration. If it has duration, it is divisible into past and future.
(circa 400/1991: 232)
Augustine’s argument is simple. He starts with the principle that
anything that is present must be simultaneous with anything else that is
present. He then points out that any finite interval of time, nomatter how
small, can be divided into non-simultaneous earlier and later parts (and
if the earlier part is present then the non-simultaneous later part clearly
is not). He then notes that the earlier part too, can be divided into earlier
and later parts. Again if the earlier part is present, then the later part is
not, and so on ad infinitum. Augustine concludes that as the continuity
of time entails that there can be no minimum temporal interval, the only
thing left for the present to be is the durationless interface between the
past and the future. The curious upshot of this conception of the present,
is that experience— if it really is confined to the present as common sense
tells us — must be strictly speaking instantaneous, and this seems very
odd, for as Newton-Smith (1980: 127) has noted, while we constantly ex-
perience temporally extended events (events of non-zero duration) we
have absolutely no direct experience of anything whatsoeverwith zero du-
ration.
One way to avoid the problem of instantaneous experience is to ex-
tend the present, and this is exactly what the early C. D. Broad does.
In analysing the present, Broad starts with the common sense observation
that all our immediate experience is confined to the present. He then
notes that, among the other things that we experience, we experiencemo-
tion. Broad writes:
But it is a notorious fact that we do not merely notice that
something has moved or changed; we also often see some-
thing moving or changing. This happens if we look at the
second-hand of a watch or look at a flickering flame... It is
also clear that to see a second-hand moving is a quite different
thing from “seeing” that an hour-hand hasmoved. In the one
case we are concerned with something that happens within a
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single sensible field; in the other we are concernedwith a com-
parison between the contents of two different sensible fields.
(1923: 351)
Now it is clear, Broad thinks, thatmotion requires an extended interval
of time in which to occur, and accordingly, that the direct perception or
experience of motion also requires an extended interval of time in which
to occur. From these points we can conclude that if experience is confined
to the present, then the present must be of extended (though minimal)
duration, for otherwise we cannot account for our experience of motion.
One important feature of this extended — or as Broad terms it, specious
— conception of the present, is that the duration of the present will be
entirely contingent on the observer’s psychology:
The particular duration of an observer’s Specious Presentmay
fairly be regarded as a peculiarity of himself or of his species.
It is known that this duration is much the same for all men
under normal conditions... [but] we can imagine ourselves
replaced by an observer who differs in no respect from us
except that his Specious Present covers the whole of his his-
tory... This conception of an observer with an infinitely long
Specious Present is useful, because we conceive of the whole
content of our history to be such as this observer would sense
it to be. (1923: 361-362)
Thus, the duration of the extended present will be defined by the lim-
its of the interval within which the observer is unable to distinguish be-
tween earlier and later parts of some sufficiently short stimulus. And for
different observers, this interval will potentially be of different durations.
So which conception of ‘the present’ is presentism committed to? I
think it is clear that presentism is committed to the former, that is, the
instantaneous present, and not the latter, that is, the extended present.
If presentism were committed to the extended present, then presentism
would be tied to the contingencies of human psychology, and this, I sug-
gest, would make presentism an anthropocentric psychological theory of
time, as opposed to the objective metaphysical theory of time that it is
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supposed to be. What’s more, if we imagine defining the present not by
way of a human observer, but instead by way of an immortal observer
whose psychology specifies a sufficiently long extended present, then it
is hard to see how presentism, at least with respect to object-existence,
will differ from eternalism.
So what does an acceptance of the instantaneous present mean for
presentism’s supposed common sense status? Yuri Balashov in his 2005
paper, ‘Times of Our Lives: Negotiating the Presence of Experience’, has
suggested that it is ‘immediately clear’ that of the theories of time avail-
able, presentism is best able to accommodate our intuitions about the
presence of experience (2005: 295).22 But is this really true? If presentism
demands that experience be instantaneous, then the direct experience of
movement, or indeed of any other phenomenon involving change, suc-
cession or persistence (including, for example, belief), appears to be im-
possible. And this hardly seems commonsensical. Can we never feel the
pain of a needle puncturing our skin, or the pleasure of our lover’s lips
against ours? Can we can never see a wheel turning, or believe that we do
so? Can we never hear a bird in song, or experience the concussive boom
of New Year’s fireworks? I think we can, and what’s more, I think it is
common sense that we can. If presentism is unable to support this in-
tuition (be it right or wrong), then presentism can hardly be considered
commonsensical.
A presentist might attempt to resist the above conclusion by invok-
ing temporal parts (or temporal object and person-stages). Rather than
requiring that enduring23 persons have instantaneous24 experiences — an
22. Amongst the three features of temporal experience that Balashov suggests a theory
of time needs to accommodate, is presentness. Presentness, being the ‘sense in which
all our experiences are known to occur in the present, as opposed to the past or future’
(2005: 295).
23. The term ‘enduring’ is used here and elsewhere to indicate a temporal extent suffi-
cient to support experience, rather than in the technical sense (as a contrast to ‘perdur-
ing’).
24. i.e. durationless experiences.
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impossibility given instants are simply too short to support direct ex-
perience — the presentist will argue that instantaneous person-stages
have the ability to ground our necessarily extended experiences. And
though an instantaneous person-stage will be just as incapable of hav-
ing an instantaneous experience as an enduring person, we will be able
to attribute to that person stage a part of the extended experience that an
enduring person would have. This sounds good at first, but the problem
is in the details. Ted Sider (2001), spelling out the position (in this case
with the example of belief, though the same applies to extended experi-
ence generally), writes that:
Having a belief does indeed require having had certain features
in the past. This is not inconsistent with the stage view, which
interprets the past having of the relevant features as amount-
ing to having temporal counterparts that have those features.
In order to have a belief, a stage must stand in an appropriate
network of counterpart relations to other stages with appro-
priate features. Thus, the property of having a belief is a highly
relational property. It nevertheless can be instantiated by in-
stantaneous [person] stages. (2001: 197-198)
The problem now becomes immediately clear: while eternalists like
Sider have the current instantaneous stage and additional counterpart
stages to appeal to— as are required to jointly constitute an extended expe-
rience— the presentists do not. With their minimal ontology, the present-
ists can concede to only a single instant of real time, and accordingly, are
unable to support the (minimally two-place) relations that are required
to make a stage-theoretic account of extended experience work.25
And there’s another problem: while the eternalists can conceivably
take the necessarily extended experience of an enduring person, break it
into temporal parts, and attribute it to the relevant person-stages of that
enduring person, it is far from clear that presentists can run things in the
25. The issue of transtemporal relations, like those that hold between temporally sepa-
rated counterparts, is discussed further in §4.4.
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other direction, i.e. ‘construct’ an extended experience out of instanta-
neous experience-parts. The grounding, or fundamentality, relation just
seems to be going the wrong way. Here’s an analogy: In physics we
define the velocity of an object as that object’s rate of change in posi-
tion over time with respect to a certain frame of reference. If we take
an instantaneous time slice of that object we can also characterise that
object-stage as having a measure of ‘instantaneous velocity’. However,
this is an abstraction. ‘Instantaneous velocity’ is a wholly derivative mea-
sure, and an object-stage has ‘instantaneous velocity’ solely in virtue of
the velocity of the object of which that object-stage is a part.26 In the
same way, although we can attribute an instantaneous person-stage with
part of an extended experience (an ‘instantaneous experience’, if you
will), that person-stage’s ‘instantaneous experience’ will be wholly de-
pendent on the extended experience of the enduring person of which
that person-stage is a part. And just as one cannot ‘construct’ an object’s
velocity out of the ‘instantaneous velocities’ attributed to that object’s
instantaneous object-stages (without first having an appropriate object
from which to establish the ‘instantaneous velocities’ of the object-stages
in the first place), so too, one cannot ‘construct’ an enduring person’s
extended experience out of the ‘instantaneous experiences’ attributed to
that person’s instantaneous person-stages (without first having an en-
during person and their extended experience from which to establish the
‘instantaneous experiences’ of the person-stages in the first place). ‘In-
stantaneous velocity’ is grounded in velocity, and ‘instantaneous expe-
rience’ is grounded in necessarily extended experience — not the other
way around. Attributing an object-stage with ‘instantaneous velocity’ is
legitimate only in a context which permits velocity. Similarly, attributing
‘instantaneous experience’ is legitimate only in a context which permits
extended experience.27 And presentism, unlike eternalism, is unable to
permit extended experience.
26. For more on the derivative nature of ‘instantaneous velocity’ see Dummett
(2000: 502) and Sider (2001: 34).
27. Mulhauser (2012) makes a similar point.
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3.2 Extension
Intuitively, there is a mathematical worry also: While one can take an
extended interval and divide it into infinitely many constitutive parts, it
is hard to see how one can go in the other direction. It is by no means
obvious that one can take infinitely many instants and ‘construct’ an ex-
tended interval out of them. Instants, by the presentist’s hypothesis, are
unextended, and adding zero to zero still gives you zero no matter how
many times you perform the addition. To helpmake this point clearer (no
pun intended), let’s place the specifically temporal case aside for a mo-
ment (pun intended), and focus instead on a standard line segment. A
line segment, as we usually think of it, is an extension in one dimension,
bounded by a pair of points. These limiting points are not themselves
extended — points are, by definition, dimensionless entities; they have
no length, area, volume, or indeed any other ‘dimensional’ attribute —
hence, the extension of the line must consist in something entirely exter-
nal to these limiting points. But a line is not just bounded by points, it is
riddled with them, with each internal point describing a specific location
along the line. What’s more, each one of these infinitely many internal
points is as extensionless as the end points. As a consequence, the exten-
sion of the line must lie entirely outside of the internal points, just as it
lies entirely outside of the end points. A. C. Strong (1928) puts the point
this way:
If the real were lodged solely in the points, and not in the
infinitesimal extensions that separate them, these extensions
would fall outside it and reality in its proper nature would not
be extended. An infinite number of punctiform reals...would
be no more extended than a single one. But in experience,
from which we derive our idea of the real...[space] is found
to be extended. Consequently we must decide for the exten-
sions and not for the points. The real could not, however,
be extended unless it consisted of separate parts...and its con-
stituents must therefore be in the infinitesimal extensions, of
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which the points are merely the boundaries.28 (1928: 395)
Now, instead of starting with a line and dividing it into infinitesimal
extensions and points, imagine starting with just the points (as many as
you like) and trying to build a line entirely out of them. You can’t, be-
cause you have no extension to work with — and a line is defined by
its extension. Rupert Read (2002) has suggested that in certain circum-
stances it may do no harm to think of a line as being composed solely of
points: ‘if one was trying to explain to a student how to measure a line;
or, more straightforwardly...if one was wishing to paint a line “Monet-
style” or “Seurat-style”’, for example. However, the temporal context is
not one of these harmless contexts, and as Read later notes, ‘it is absurd to
surmise that a collectivity, no matter how large, of dimensionless points
could actually result in something with dimension’ (2002: 193). Wemight
find it tempting to think of points as very small dots (as they are often pic-
tured in geometry textbooks), and then imagine them somehow melting
together to form a continuum. But when we think of points as tiny dots
we are inadvertently contradicting their nature by endowing them with
extension (Strong, 1928: 394). Being small is having some (small) extent,
and points have none.
Now, moving away from the general case, let’s return to the temporal
case — remembering that an interval is just a line segment (or line) in the
temporal dimension, and an instant is just a temporal point. As we saw, a
continuous line is infinitely divisible and so can be divided into infinitely
many infinitesimal extensions and extensionless points. In the same way,
an interval (as a temporal line) can be divided into infinitely many in-
finitesimal intervals and durationless instants.29 However, just as you
28. Of special interest is Strong’s recognition that (space) is found to be extended in ex-
perience, and that for this reason we ‘must decide for the extensions and not for the
points’. To do the reverse, and make points prior to extension, is to impose an ill-fitting
mathematical model on to reality, which goes against the presentist’s underlying moti-
vations of accommodating our common sense experiences. For more on the poor fit of
the ‘classical model’ see Dummett (2000).
29. Not, importantly, durationless instants alone. The extension has to go somewhere.
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cannot construct a line out of extensionless points alone, you equally can-
not construct an interval out of durationless instants alone — you cannot
add an instant to an instant and hope for anything more than an instant
in return.30 Andwhile eternalists have an interval upon which to ground
their instants, presentists have only the present moment (a single dura-
tionless instant) from which they must construct their intervals. Above
I argued that attributing a person-stage with ‘instantaneous experience’
only makes sense in a context in which extended experience is permit-
ted. The fact that instants appear to be grounded by intervals simply
reinforces this point, and gives us another reason for thinking that ‘in-
stantaneous experience’ must be grounded by necessarily extended ex-
perience, and not the other way around.31
The difficulty, ultimately, comes back to the durationless present that
the presentist wishes to employ. But the presentist is in a tight spot (pun
intended) — she cannot easily admit to an extended present for the rea-
son established above. If time is a continuum, as is generally believed,
and the present has temporal extent, then the present can be divided into
earlier and later parts — and this is unacceptable to the presentist. Yet
there seems no way to get necessarily extended experience out of dura-
tionless instants. And it’s not only experience that proves impossible to
‘construct’; every other extended entity — every single concrete, spatio-
temporal object and event — is missing in action as well. For just as it is
impossible to ‘construct’ experience out of durationless experience-parts,
so too it is impossible to ‘construct’ other extended objects and events out
of durationless object and event-parts. It might initially seem plausible to
suppose that what ‘really’ exists presently exists, but if present existence
is instantaneous existence, then present existence is no existence at all!
Consider the following present-tensed statement:
 The queen is dancing.
30. Well, you’ll have two instants, but you still won’t have an interval.
31. See Newton-Smith (1980: 134-138) for more on the relationship between intervals
and instants.
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For the above statement to be true at least the following two things must
exist: the queen, and her dancing. But if the only ‘real’ time is the present
time, and the present time is a durationless instant, then it is (sadly)
impossible for the above statement to be true. Queens — and dancing
queens as well — are unambiguously concrete entities; they have spatio-
temporal extent. However, the presentist’s present is like a dress that
the queen cannot get into: it is a durationless instant, and is too tight a
fit for a spatio-temporally extended queen. As Zimmerman (1996b: 124)
rightly notes: ‘every temporal part of a persisting object has some dura-
tion...[so] there is no hope of showing persistence through time to be a
phenomenon which can be understood entirely in terms of certain rela-
tions holding among non-persisting things’ (emphasis mine).
To say that some concrete entity has existed for a period of zero dura-
tion is the same as saying that that entity hasn’t existed at all. In fact, the
very idea of a ‘period’ of zero duration, is a piece of nonsense in itself. It is
like a lengthless length, or a distanceless distance (or even a small point).
Spatio-temporal objects and events cannot be constructed out of instan-
taneous object and event-parts, because instantaneous object and event-
parts do not ‘really’ exist; they are pure abstractions; useful abstractions,
but abstractions nonetheless. Along the same lines, although we describe
instants as temporal points, the points are temporal ones only in the sense
that they indicate temporal locations on a coordinate grid. Likewise, spa-
tial points are spatial only in the sense that they indicate spatial locations
on a coordinate grid. Points, I suggest, are not spatio-temporal entities at
all: they are idealizations used in models. Here’s another way of putting
things: the defining feature of space-time is that it is extended in four di-
mensions; it is four-dimensional. And a defining feature of points is that
they are extensionless; they are zero-dimensional —which is just another
way of saying that they are not spatio-temporal.32
32. Even if I am wrong about the spatio-temporal status of points, at least the follow-
ing Augustinian point should be admitted: spatio-temporally existing points will exist
solely in virtue of that which they bound/interface between; they will have no indepen-
dent spatio-temporal existence. And since the presentist has no past and future concrete
§3.3 EXTENSION 44
I believe I am in good company in thinking that point-sized objects
and events are pure abstractions.33 Bertrand Russell, in An Outline of
Philosophy, writes:
Everything in the world is composed of ‘events’... An ‘event’,
as I understand it, is something having a small finite duration
and a small finite extension in space; or rather, in the view
of the theory of relativity, it is something occupying a small
finite amount of space-time. If it has parts, these parts, I say,
are again events, never something occupying a mere point or
instant, whether in space, in time, or in space-time.
(1927/1995: 222)
His point here is not that a “spatio-temporal point” cannot indicate
a location within the space and time occupied by a concrete spatio-
temporal entity, but rather, that the spatio-temporal entities, or concrete
objects, that fill spatio-temporal regions can never have spatial parts
without spatial extension or temporal parts without temporal extension.
If this is correct, and I can see no compelling reason to think otherwise,
then presentism has a serious problem on its hands. Remember present-
ism, by definition, has only one ‘real’ time, the present time, to workwith.
And if the present time is instantaneous — as it must be if time is a con-
tinuum— then presentism has nowhere to place objects and events with
temporal extent. Or to put it another way, it has nowhere to place any,
and all, of the concrete spatio-temporal entities that make up our world.
There can be no theses, so I cannot be writing this. In fact, I cannot exist
at all, and neither can you. Presentism and common sense appear to be
about as far apart as it is possible to be!
times for the present instant to interface between, it is hard to see how their present mo-
ment can have any spatio-temporal existence — and so support the existence of any
spatio-temporal objects and events.
33. See Zimmerman (1996a) for an excellent history and overview of the debate sur-
rounding the status of points.
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3.3 Atomic Time
So far, so good. But I may have been unfair to the presentist: I have as-
sumed that time is a continuum, and this may have been a mistake. Per-
haps, instead, time is discrete, and there are indivisible ‘atomic instants’
with positive temporal extent? Russell gestures towards this possibility
when he notes that while a spatio-temporal entity necessarily occupies
some portion of space and time, this ‘does not prove that it has parts’
(1927/1995: 222). If time is granular in this way — if it is ultimately con-
stituted by, or at least divisible into, discrete extended temporal atoms —
then perhaps the presentist needn’t worry about having nowhere to put
the world?34 And if the idea of discrete time is not exactly popular, at
least it has a long and noble history, with supporters appearing as early
as the 5th century B.C.E..35
There is admittedly some difficulty in conceiving of time in this dis-
crete way. It is hard to imagine, for instance, how any extension (either
spatial or temporal) could fail to have parts — divisibility seems to be
one of the defining features of extension.36 But let us set this worry aside
for now; for while it is true that common sense appears, prima facie, to
support continuous time over discrete time, the presentist is not in a po-
sition to argue. She must either accept discrete time, or do without the
world.
With the acceptance of discrete time, presentism (now) has some ex-
tension in the picture, and so is in a much better position than it was be-
fore. For a start, the spatio-temporal world is back — or at least a present
piece of it. And, in addition, our earlier mathematical worry is resolved
34. It has sometimes been thought that time could be discrete, but that its ‘temporal’
atoms might still have no temporal extent. This view would be no help to the presentist
for the reasons detailed above. If presentists are going to opt for discrete time, it will be
the kind with temporally extended temporal atoms.
35. The founders of atomism, for instance — Leucippus and Democritus —who argued
that matter, and extension more generally, are not infinitely physically divisible (though
they are infinitely geometrically divisible) (Russell, 1946/2004: 72).
36. For more on this issue, see Newton-Smith (1980: VI).
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— for while it was shown to be impossible to construct an extended inter-
val out of extensionless instants, there is no obvious issue with construct-
ing an extended interval out of smaller extended intervals. The presentist
is not out of the woods yet, though; there is still the issue of accounting
for actual extended experience. With that in mind, let’s return to Broad’s
example of a paradigm extended experience: the experience of motion.
As I argued above, both motion, and our experience of motion, re-
quire an extended period of time (an interval) in which to occur. For tra-
ditional presentists—who are committed to both continuous time and an
instantaneous present — this requirement for temporal extension poses
an insurmountable challenge. However, presentists who adopt a dis-
crete account of time, with a temporally extended but indivisible atomic
present (call them ‘atomic presentists’), are somewhat better positioned.
They have a small amount of extension to work with, and so are able
to support motion in a way that traditional presentists are not.37 Even
so, accounting for our experience of motion is not easy. Motion requires
temporal extension, but that extension can be exceedingly minimal. The
experience of motion, on the other hand, requires a substantially longer in-
terval — and it’s not clear that atomic presentism can deliver it.
While it is hard to accurately estimate the exact length of time nec-
essary for biological creatures like us to consciously experience motion,
the period required is undoubtedly longer than the atomic presentist’s
present (the ‘AP-present’). Imagine a light being turned on in a dark
room. You flick a light switch and as the tungsten filament in the incan-
descent bulb heats up the bulb begins to emit light. If the bulb is not
centrally placed in the room light will strike the walls at different times
before being reflected back to your eyes. If we could slow light down
sufficiently we would see light flooding across the room. But we never
actually see that; light’s motion is just too fast for us to register over such
a short distance and temporal interval. Once the light is turned on the
37. Though not motion as it is conventionally understood by physics (where continuity
is assumed).
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entire room appears to light up instantaneously, but this is the result of
the limitations of our psychological and perceptual systems, and is not
an accurate reflection of what actually happens.
The lighting of the room may be experientially indivisible, but is still
very much temporally divisible — even for atomic presentists, with their
discrete account of time. The temporal extension of the AP-present is
presumably well below one attosecond (light travels the length of two
hydrogen atoms in an attosecond). But even if we arbitrarily fix the tem-
poral extension of the AP-present at one attosecond, the number of dis-
crete “instants” between the light switch being flicked on, and light com-
pletely filling the room, will be extraordinary. To put the point in Broad’s
terms, the specious present is of considerably greater length than the AP-
present.
Atomic presentism, like traditional presentism, has only one concrete
time in its ontology — the present time. And this makes it vulnerable to
many of the same arguments as traditional presentism. In section 3.1,
we saw how traditional presentism’s minimal ontology made it impos-
sible for it to support experience. Experience is necessarily extended,
but traditional presentism demands that experience be instantaneous —
which it isn’t. Atomic presentism is similarly flawed: because although
its ontology includes a little extension, that extension is not enough, on its
own, to support experience. Our dancing queen may be able to squeeze
into the AP-present, but her experiences can’t — and atomic presentism
has no more extension to give her. The ontological resources of atomic
presentism, like traditional presentism, are just too limited to do the job
required of them.
Moving from traditional presentism to atomic presentism gains the
presentist a piece of the world, but that piece alone is not enough. Dis-
crete time will not get presentism out of trouble. (And presentism really
is, I think, in deep trouble.) After all, what could be more commonsen-
sical — more fundamentally commonsensical — than that we experience
things? Yet presentism, the theory of time supposedly most in tune with
common sense and common experience, turns out not to be ontologically
rich enough to support experience at all.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Arrow of Time and Presentism
4.1 Time’s Arrow
Of all our experiences of time, none is more vivid, and universal, than
that of temporal becoming. Time has an orientation, an arrow, a directed
flow, and we are swept along with it. As Hans Reichenbach put it in the
first paragraph of his landmark The Direction of Time:
Not only the events of the external world but even all our sub-
jective experiences occur in time. It appears as though the
flow of time, which orders the events of the physical world,
passes through human consciousness and compels it to adjust
itself to the same order. Our observations of physical things,
our feelings and emotions, and our thinking processes extend
through time and cannot escape the steady current that flows
unhaltingly from the past by way of the present to the future.
(1956/1999: 1)
But although temporal becoming and the associated directionality of
time in human experience is utterly uncontroversial, the ontology that is
said to underlie that experience is entirely another matter. Presentism,
as we saw earlier, wants to maintain that we experience what we do be-
cause time is dynamic and directed. Eternalism, on the other hand, typi-
cally wants to maintain that we experience what we do solely in light of
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our psychology; time might be dynamic and directed, but it needn’t be.38
However, let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is the present-
ists that have right of it. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that
our experience of temporal passage, and the associated directionality of
time, simply (and commonsensically) correspond to the nature of time it-
self. Our experience of time is dynamic and directed, because time itself
is dynamic and directed. Now, putting aside the dynamic aspect of time
temporarily, how might a presentist consistently cash out the idea that
time is directed? I argue that she cannot, and that as a result, present-
ism is simply unable to deliver on the common sense that it purports to
support. Presentism, once again, will prove to be in conflict with its very
reason for being. So how does the argument go?
Let me begin with a quote from Paul Horwich:
The quintessential property of time, it may seem, is difference
between past and future. And here I don’t just mean that the
past and future are separate regions, or that the past and fu-
ture directions along the continuum of instants are opposite
to one another, but rather that these two directions are some-
how fundamentally unalike... This idea is fostered by the de-
sire to explain pervasive temporally asymmetric phenomena,
such as causation, knowledge, decay, and the phenomenolog-
ical feeling of ‘moving into the future’. And it is reflected in
the use of such phrases as “time’s arrow” and our inclination
to say that time ‘goes’ in one direction and not the other. De-
spite the fact that these expressions have an air or metaphor
about them, they clearly imply anisotropy — that is, a signifi-
cant lack of symmetry between the two directions of the tem-
poral continuum. We tend to believe, in short, that time itself
is temporally asymmetric. (1987: 15)
But how can presentism support anisotropy and thus directionality?
Clearly not by way of topology; of all the theories of time, presentism
38. As noted in chapter one, eternalists generally maintain that time is static and
undirected. However, eternalism is in a more flexible position than presentism, and
can incorporate dynamism and preferred direction if desired. See Maudlin (2007) and
Cameron (2015) for more on this type of eternalism.
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is, topologically speaking, undeniably the most isotropic. And while an
eternalist, for instance, might provide us with a branching (and so po-
tentially intrinsically anisotropic) temporal topology, the presentist, with
only a single concrete instant to work with, will find their topological op-
tions limited. Presentism’s raw ontology, I think, is simply ill suited to
supporting topological asymmetry. So how else then, if not topologically,
might presentism produce the required anisotropy? The only route that I
can see is for presentism to take some ubiquitous temporally asymmetric
phenomenon, such as knowledge, and then reduce time’s directionality
to that. Obviously knowledge itself will not do — we do not want time’s
directionality to be contingent on living, learning critters like us — but a
couple of classic non-anthropocentric, asymmetric phenomena do present
themselves: entropy and causation. I will look at each of these options in
what follows.
Before we look at entropy and causation though, a quick note on dy-
namism is in order. Sometimes it is thought that time’s arrow can be ex-
plained solely in terms of dynamism; that a primitive process of temporal
becoming is all that is needed to provide time with a preferred direction.
Laurie Paul (2014) describes the view this way:
...there is a fundamental temporal tendency of the universe
to evolve forward by successively creating world-stage from
world-stage, one stage producing the next by causally gener-
ating it via the action of productive laws of nature. It is an
irreducible and primitive feature of our fundamental ontol-
ogy that time passes, that is, things dynamically happen from
earlier to later in accordance with productive laws of nature.
(2014: 179–180)
The problem with this view, it seems to me, is that dynamism alone
cannot provide the presentist with a preferred temporal direction. Tem-
poral dynamism, for the presentist, is simply temporal change; it is the
process of one time being replaced by another. But change is wholly sym-
metrical when viewed from an a-temporal perspective, so it cannot pro-
vide the presentist with the asymmetry that is required to explain time’s
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arrow. And adding the laws of nature doesn’t help, because the laws are
time-reversible and thus temporally symmetrical too. It is only when the
idea of causal generation is introduced into the picture that a preferred
temporal direction emerges. But this suggests that it is causation that is
providing the required asymmetry, and not dynamism after all. So why
not just say that it is causation that gives time its arrow? That’s something
we’ll look at shortly. But first, entropy.
4.2 Entropy
Entropy, roughly speaking, is chaos. More precisely (and accurately)
speaking, entropy is a measure of how close a system is to equilibrium
with respect to the distribution of energy within that system. If the en-
ergy within the system is concentrated in a few specific areas, the system
is far from equilibrium and is said to be in a low-entropy state. However,
if the energy is spread approximately evenly throughout the system, the
system is close to equilibrium and is said to be in a high-entropy state. By
itself, this notion of entropy indicates little pertaining to the direction of
time. But, in conjunction with the second law of thermodynamics, which
states that entropy will tend to increase in a closed system, we have a re-
liable, objective, and temporally asymmetric phenomenon that may pro-
vide the required anisotropy for grounding the direction of time.39 So, for
example, on any temporal continuum, an instant will be “earlier” than a
second instant if it is in a lower entropy state than the second instant, and
39. As Roger Penrose notes in The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Uni-
verse, many physicists take the view that the second law of thermodynamics is ‘some-
thing vague and imprecise’ (2004: 698). Certainly there are many different formulations
of it. Penrose, himself, goes with ‘The second law of thermodynamics asserts that the en-
tropy of an isolated system increases with time (or remains constant for a reversible system)’
(1999: 400), and the simpler ‘entropy increases with time’ (2004: 699). Price introduces
the second law as ‘the universal tendency of entropy to increase’ (1996: 22). Dainton
goes with a similar characterization: ‘the second law of thermodynamics...dictates that
entropy tends to increase over time’ (2001: 47). And Reichenbach takes the second law
to be that ‘the entropy of a closed system increases as long as any processes are going
on within it’ (1956/1999: 53).
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similarly, an instant will be “later” than a second instant if it is in a higher
entropy state than the second instant.
So far so good, but unfortunately there are some fairlymajor problems
(particularly for common sense presentism), which need to be overcome
before entropy can be considered a successful answer to the problem of
preferred temporal direction. The first of these problems relates to the
statistical nature of the second law of thermodynamics, and the fact that
entropy only tends to increase.40 If the second law of thermodynamics
said that entropy always increases in a closed system, then we might (bar-
ring other objections), have a common sense answer to the problem of
preferred temporal direction. However, as entropy only tends to increase,
if the presentist were to tie the directionality of time to entropy and the
second law of thermodynamics, then the presentist would have to say
that time only tends to go “forward”, and this doesn’t seem commonsen-
sical at all. Will the advocate of common sense be happy with the notion
that time mostly goes forward? It doesn’t seem probable to me.
The second problem lies in the supposed connection between en-
tropy and the phenomenal arrow of time (which entropy, as the ultimate
ground, is supposed to explain). As Barry Dainton (2001) writes:
[S]uppose that (due to a freakish sequence of molecular mo-
tions) the water in the eastern half of the Atlantic Ocean were
to become, on average, 20C warmer than the western half, a
process that takes two weeks. Throughout this period the en-
tropy in the Atlantic would be decreasing. What effect would
there be on the occupants? Well no doubt a great deal of plant
and animal life would be significantly affected by the dra-
matic and unseasonal changes in temperature; there would
be serious meteorological consequences too. But there is no
reason to believe that anything else of interest or significance
would happen. (2001: 50)
40. In 1889 mathematician Henri Poincaré showed that, given enough time, a decrease
in entropy is not only possible, but inevitable (Price, 1996: 33).
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Particularly, it seems to me, there is no commonsensical reason to be-
lieve that time would start running backwards in the Atlantic: a fisher-
man’s outboard motor would not go into reverse, and neither would the
hands of his watch start going anti-clockwise. Any prediction that sug-
gests otherwise, seems not only wrong, but commonsensically wrong.
And here’s another revealing scenario: suppose that instead of de-
creasing (or increasing), the entropy in the Atlantic ‘remains’ static from
moment to moment. While this might seem unlikely, there is no partic-
ular reason why it couldn’t happen — indeed, statistically speaking, it is
bound to happen eventually. The Atlantic need not be in entropic equi-
librium either, it could occur at any point along the entropic spectrum:
from a very low entropy state where the majority of the Atlantic’s heat
energy is concentrated in a small area, to a high entropy state where the
Atlantic’s heat energy is pretty much evenly distributed. If the entropy
in the Atlantic were to remain static in this way, would we truly want to
say that time had no preferred direction in the Atlantic? It seems very
unlikely. But if the direction of time is tied to entropy then this is exactly
what we must say.
The objection can be made even more compelling once it is noted that
the macroscopic properties of any particular macrostate (including its
macroscopic entropic properties) can usually be realized by a vast mul-
titude of different microstates (the varying microscopic arrangements of
a macrostate’s constituent parts). Consider again the Atlantic in a fixed
entropic state, but this time note that the microstate of the Atlantic could
be constantly fluctuating while the entropic properties of the macrostate
remain stable. In this case the Atlantic will be in a state of continuous
microphysical change — one microstate will ‘follow’ or ‘flow’ into an-
other — but, given the entropic account of temporal direction, time in the
Atlantic will have no direction; there will be no fact of the matter about
which microstate came (temporally) first. And for the presentist this will
seem utterly bizarre.
It might be tempting for the presentist to dismiss the above arguments
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on the grounds that they reference entropy in a restricted area (the At-
lantic), rather than universal entropy. And this is a fair point. If the
present moment is the only existent concrete moment — and thus a uni-
versally privileged moment — then it makes sense to think that time is a
universal matter, not a local one. Given this, it also makes sense to think
that we should be looking at universal entropy rather than local entropy
when explaining the direction of time. If the presentist is correct, the en-
tropic state of the Atlantic will largely be irrelevant: we should not expect
the direction of time in the Atlantic to reverse if the entropy in the At-
lantic reverses, because universal entropy will (probably) still be increas-
ing even if local entropy is not. As far as it goes this objection is success-
ful, but I think it misses the point somewhat. Dainton uses the example
of the Atlantic because it is easy to visualise and understand — however,
it is simple enough to reconstruct the examples on a universal rather than
local scale if desired. Just as the second law of thermodynamics allows
that the entropy could decrease (or remain static) in the Atlantic, so too
it allows that entropy could decrease (or remain static) universally. And
shifting from a local to a universal perspective makes the connection be-
tween entropy and the preferred direction of time no more compelling.
We would not expect the hand on a fisherman’s watch to start running
in reverse if the entropy in the Atlantic started to decrease, and similarly,
we would not expect the hands on a fisherman’s watch to start running
in reverse if universal entropy started to decrease. Perhaps the intuition
is even stronger in the universal case, because universal entropy could
easily be decreasing while local entropy continued to increase. And if the
local area of entropy-increase was sufficiently large, we would not even
know that entropy was decreasing at a universal level!
If there is any problem with scenarios involving local entropy de-
creases, it is not so much because they are local but because they typically
involve non-isolated systems. While entropy can be measured in local re-
gions, if those regions are not isolated the second law of thermodynamics
does not apply. In a non-isolated system there is no reason to suppose that
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entropy will even tend increase. This means that there is no reason to ex-
pect an anisotropic entropy gradient in a local region, and so no reason
to want to tie the direction of time to local entropy in the first place. Take
a very local example: an uninsulated room with a heater in one corner.
If the heater is off, the thermal energy in the room is likely to be fairly
evenly distributed, so the entropy of the room will be close to equilib-
rium. But if the heater is turned on the situation changes dramatically.
On the one hand, more energy is being introduced to the system, and it is
being introduced asymmetrically, so the entropy of the room as a whole
decreases. On the other hand, energy is escaping the room through the
uninsulated walls, meaning that the temperature in the room will never
reach equilibrium. The second law of thermodynamics does not apply
to open systems, and for this reason alone, we should prefer universal
entropy to local entropy as a potential source for the direction of time.
But as I have already argued, even if we move to universal entropy the
connection between entropy and temporal direction seems suspicious.
Here’s another reason to worry. Suppose universal entropy dips and
then rises again, so that the entropy gradient across time has a V-like
shape.41 At the lowest point is time going ‘backwards’ or ‘forwards’? Or,
to put it another way, is the low point the last instant of an entropic drop
or the first instant of an entropic rise? There seems no good answer, so
there seems no good answer about the direction of time at that instant.
In fact, there is an even more basic problem for presentists hoping to
explain the direction of time by way of entropy. Imagine, for a moment,
being handed a completely accurate representation of a temporal slice
of a very small universe — a crystallised moment, if you will. Perhaps
it looks something like a single frame of processed transparency film (a
41. Incidentally, given the probabilistic nature of entropy, and the fact that we know
that universal entropy is currently low, a V-shaped curve is (overwhelmingly) the most
likely shape for the an entropic curve compatible with the current state of the universe
to take. When you are at an entropic low point in an isolated system, the most likely
scenario (by far) is that you are at one of the minima of the entropic curve and entropy
rises in both temporal directions (Price, 1996: 34-35). This gives us another reason to
worry about the connection between entropy and temporal anisotropy.
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slide). Looking at this “crystallised moment” you are able to see the po-
sition and state of every single object in that universe. You are, in other
words, able to tell how the energy is distributed in that system. Now,
imagine you are given an empty slide-box, to place your slide in, and
two labels. One of the labels is red, and the other label is blue. The red
label, you are told, signifies the beginning of time, and it should be stuck
to one end of the slide-box. The blue label signifies the end of time, and
should be stuck to the opposing end of the slide box. Given the positions
and states of the objects represented on your slide, you surmise that your
slide should be positioned somewhere near the middle of the slide-box.
But which way around should it face? Or, to put it another way, which
face of the slide should be positioned towards the red sticker, and which
side of the slide should be positioned towards the blue sticker? You can’t
tell, and for a very good reason: point sized objects (which is what your
slide represents — it’s extensionless in the temporal dimension) have no
intrinsic spatio-temporal orientation. This is because they are not truly
spatio-temporal entities. There is no right answer regarding which way
around the slide should face, because it doesn’t face either way (it’s a trick
question)! In exactly the same way, the present moment has no intrinsic
direction.42
Suppose, though, that you are given enough slides to fill the slide box.
Each slide represents a different temporal slice of the tiny universe, and
after examining them carefully you are able to order them by the entropy
states represented in each of them. Since you know that entropy tends to
rise, you know to arrange them so that the slide with the lowest entropy
value is positioned at the end of the slide-box with the red sticker on
it, and the slide with the highest entropy value is positioned at the end
of the slide-box with the blue sticker on it. Now, although no individ-
ual slide has a “correct orientation”, the group does. Great! A problem
for presentists though, is that they only have the equivalent of a single
42. I am inclined to think that this argument is entirely decisive; however, a very similar
point was made at length in the previous chapter, so I will not spend any more time on
it here.
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slide. And the entropy value of a single slide can’t tell you anything at
all about time’s orientation. Simply put, it is not the entropy of a single
concrete time that has the potential to ontologically ground time’s appar-
ent orientation, but the entropy gradient across multiple concrete times.
And presentism, with its minimal ontology, doesn’t have the resources to
support such a gradient.
4.3 Causation
Entropy then, I think, cannot be the go-to for the presentist looking to ex-
plain ontologically grounded preferred temporal direction. What about
causation?
At first sight causation looks to be highly promising. Dainton
(2001: 51) suggests that, of the various ways of explaining temporal
anisotropy, causation stands out ‘by virtue of its straightforward simplic-
ity’.43 And Reichenbach (1956/1999: 24) regards the ‘close connection’
between causation and time as the key to explaining temporal ordering
and direction, declaring that the onlyway to find a ‘suitable explication of
time’ is through a ‘study of the relationships of causality’.44 Ultimately,
I think that Reichenbach’s confidence is misplaced, and that the relation-
ship between causation and temporal direction is more complicated than
Dainton suggests — especially for the presentist — but, at least initially,
the prospect of explaining temporal direction by way of causation does
look good. After all, not only does causation appear to be a highly tempo-
rally asymmetric phenomenon — effects succeed their causes and never
the other way around45 —but it also appears to (directly) explain a num-
ber of other temporally asymmetric phenomena including, but not lim-
ited to, why we explain future events in terms of past events, but not past
43. Though he ultimately finds it wanting.
44. Also see Reichenbach (1957: 135-149).
45. Or so our everyday experience seems to suggest. Below some pressure will be put
upon this assumption.
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events in terms of future events; why our actions and deliberations are pri-
marily future-focused; why we have memories and other records of the
past but not of the future; and, more generally, why we knowmore about
the past than we do about the future.
One issue that proponents of the causal theory of temporal direction
will have to deal with immediately, however, is the worry that an analy-
sis of temporal priority in terms of causal priority will be circular, and so
trivial. If the causal theory is going to provide a satisfactory analysis of
a preferred temporal direction, then it will need to be able to distinguish
between causes and effects without relying on the earlier/later distinc-
tion. Reichenbach puts the point this way:
In the experiences of everyday life we take it for granted that
the cause-effect relation is directed. We are convinced that a
later event cannot be the cause of an earlier event. But when
we are asked how to distinguish the cause from the effect, we
usually say that of two causally connected events, the cause
is the one that precedes the other in time. That is, we define
causal direction in terms of time direction. Such a procedure
is not permissible if we wish to reduce time to causality.
(1956/1999: 27)
It will not do, for example, for the causal theorist to adopt a Humean
conventionalist account of causal order. On Hume’s view, causation is
to be understood in terms of regularity, where causation is nothing more
than constant conjunction – a temporally symmetrical notion — and the
distinction between a cause and an effect is entirely due to linguistic con-
vention.
...we define a cause to be an object precedent and contiguous to
another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac’d
in a like relation of priority and contiguity to those objects, that
resemble the latter. (1739/1985: 222)
Hume’s conventionalism certainly guarantees that time and causa-
tion will always have the same orientation, but it provides no non-trivial
explanation for time’s direction. The link between causal priority and
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temporal priority is strictly a matter of definition, and is linguistic rather
than ontological in nature. Sure, backwards causation will be impossible
— which some causal theorists regard as a positive thing46 — but this is
true in virtue of our linguistic practices, not because of anything substan-
tial about the nature of time or causation. If we accept the conventional-
ist account and wish to maintain that temporal direction is reducible to
causal direction, we must accept that we can change the direction of time
simply by changing our linguistic practices. And this is utterly at odds
with common sense.47
What the causal theorist needs then, is to find some way of distin-
guishing between causes and effects without reference to temporal direc-
tion or temporal relations. If they can do that, then they should be able to
reduce temporal direction to causal direction in a non-circular way. This
seems easy enough at first: causes make their effects happen, and not the
other way around. But although the asymmetric dependence of effects on
their causes seems obvious enough to many, there are others who argue
that this appearance of dependence is primarily a result of our subjective
view as temporally-embedded beings. Huw Price cites Stephen Hawk-
ing, for instance, who writes that:
...in physics we believe that there are laws that determine the
evolution of the universe uniquely. So if state A evolved into
state B, one could say that A caused B. But one could equally
well look at it in the other direction of time, and say that B
caused A. So causality does not define a direction of time.
(1996: 134)
However, as Price goes on to note, those who dismiss our ordinary,
common sense, temporally asymmetric notions of causation typically fail
46. See Tooley (1997), and Mellor (1998), for example.
47. As a side note, presentists, as proponents of common sense, should be averse to
the Humean account for another reason. As Miller (2009: 131) observes, common sense
seems to strongly support causal realism— the view that there are necessary connections
between causes and their effects — whereas Hume’s regularity account is generally
interpreted as being anti-realist in nature.
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to notice how deeply psychologically embedded those notions really are
— and how they inevitably constrain our ideas about what counts as an
acceptable physical theory. Price asks us to imagine that we are wearing
polarizing sunglasses and looking at the sky: photons emitted by distant
stars will be passing through our glasses, into our eyes, and then being
detected by our retinas. He then asks us to imagine that some of those
photons have passed through another polarising lens earlier in their jour-
ney. Price’s thought is this: when we consider one of those photons
halfway through its journey — and so situated between the two polar-
ising lenses — we have the very compelling intuition that the state of
that photon does not depend on the fact that it is going to pass through
our glasses in the near future. Rather, we are utterly convinced that its
state depends the fact that it has passed through another polarizing lens
earlier in its journey. In other words, we think that the photon’s state
depends on the past but not on the future. If Hawking is right then we
should treat this intuition as being purely anthropocentric in origin, but
in fact even physicists are disinclined to proceed in this way. In partic-
ular, Price notes that contemporary quantum mechanics ‘embodies what
seems to be a concrete representation of the fact that the state of the pho-
ton depends on its past but not its future’ (1996: 134-135).48 Price, him-
self, regards this as a very unsatisfactory feature of the standard model
of quantum theory. However, those who favour a causal account of tem-
poral direction may well feel that Hawking’s objection against the causal
theory — that the laws of physics are time-symmetrical — loses much of
48. A nice example of this inconsistent treatment can be found in (Manning, Khakimov,
Dall, and Truscott, 2015), which reports a recent physical realisation of John Wheeler’s
famous delayed choice thought experiment using lasers and helium atoms. Two inter-
pretations are offered for the results of the experiment. On one interpretation backwards
causation occurs; on the other interpretation the helium atoms used in the experiment
have neither wave-like nor particle-like properties until they are measured. Both inter-
pretations fit the data, but backwards causation is dismissed without argument. Else-
where, the team leader for the project, Professor Andrew Truscott, suggests that the
experiment ‘proves’ that ‘[a]t the quantum level, reality does not exist if you are not
looking at it’ (2015), nicely demonstrating (by way of comparison) the strength of our
intuition that backwards causation does not occur.
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its strength in light of the fact that physics treats the supposed reversibil-
ity of physical laws inconsistently. Certainly at least, the objection cannot
be decisive with physics in its current conflicted state.
Another interesting (and related) argument against the causal account
of temporal direction is the possibility of backwards causation. For a
simple causal account of temporal direction to be convincing, causation
needs to run in one direction. If temporal direction is directly given by
causal direction but causal direction is variable— sometimes it goes from
“past” to “future” and sometimes it goes from “future” to “past” — then
temporal direction will also be variable. And this doesn’t seem right.
Dainton (2001: 52) puts the worry this way: ‘The claim that for E1 to be
earlier than E2 it is sufficient that E1 causes E2 would be undermined if it
turned out that backwards causation were a possibility’. Does backwards
causation ever actually occur? It’s hard to know for sure: both intuition
and experience count strongly against it, yet it would be overstating the
case to say that it seems outright impossible. Of course, the possibility
that we conceive of may be of the purely logical variety — backwards
causation may still turn out to be nomologically impossible. If this is
the case, then the causal theorist needn’t worry so long as they take the
direction of time to be a contingent, rather than necessary matter. Since
we never actually experience backwards causation, and since the causal
theorist needn’t be committed to anything more than the nomological
impossibility of backwards causation, I think that the problem can be
safely put aside while we await the results of future empirical research
on the matter.
A similar problem is posed the by the possibility of simultaneous cau-
sation. Again, it’s hard to be certain if simultaneous causation ever actu-
ally occurs, but if it does, and time’s direction is dependent on causal
direction, then some events will be defined as “earlier” than others de-
spite occurring at the same time as them. Perhaps the most famous ex-
ample of supposed simultaneous causation comes from Kant, who gives
the example of a ball resting on a cushion:
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...if I view as a cause a ball which impresses a hollow as it lies
on a stuffed cushion, the cause is simultaneous with the effect.
(Kant, 1781/1933: A203, as cited in Mellor, 1998: 108)
Other cases of potential simultaneous causation mentioned in the lit-
erature include the high temperature of an iron bar causing the bar to
glow; the movement of one end of a rod causing movement at the other
end of the rod; a locomotive causing a carriage it is pulling to travel with
it, and so on. There are two standard objections to these cases. The first
comes from Special Relativity, which specifies that nothing — including
causation — can be transmitted faster than the speed of light. Since light
has a finite speed this means that over no distance, no matter how small,
can causation be simultaneous. Of course, if one rejects Special Relativ-
ity, as presentists arguably must, then this objection will not be available.
The second standard objection is that in each of the above cases what is
really going on is minimally staggered causation, rather than simultane-
ous causation. Mellor (1998: 110) takes this approachwhen he argues that
in Kant’s example the cushion’s ‘inevitably imperfect rigidity lets every
point within start to move only after the surface between it and the ball
starts to move’. Huemer and Kovitz (2003: 557-558) suggest a similar rea-
son for thinking that simultaneous causation is not really involved in the
case of the locomotive and its carriage. They note that in the real world
no material is perfectly rigid, and that because of this there will be a cer-
tain amount of stretching between the front of the locomotive and the
back of the carriage. The locomotive starts moving slightly earlier than
the carriage, so each stage of the locomotive’s movement causes a slightly
later stage of the carriage’s movement.49 The causation involved, in other
words, is staggered, rather than simultaneous. Since considerations of
this sort can be applied to all cases involving the motion of concrete bod-
ies, it appears that simultaneous causation is not required in the case of
the rod either. The case of the glowing bar is slightly more complex, but
involves the same sort of staggered causation that we see in the other
49. The argument is attributed to Tooley (1987).
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cases. Here, the time lag between the cause and the effect is to be found
in the temporal gap between an electron’s energy absorption and its cor-
responding radiation.50 If, at first, we are inclined to think that the case
of the glowing bar is a case of simultaneous causation, then this is due to
the manner in which we describe the situation, and not in the situation it-
self. By delineating causes and effects more precisely we can see that the
causation involved is temporally asymmetric after all (Rosenberg, 1975).
4.4 Transtemporal Relations
So far I have been looking at general reasons to worry about the causal
account of preferred temporal direction, and so far I have found those
reasons to be relatively uncompelling. There are, of course, objections I
have not touched on here51 — and the ones that I have touched on I have
not examined in any great depth — but at the very least I am inclined to
think that the causal account of temporal direction is significantly more
compelling than the entropic account of temporal direction. This should
not be taken as a sign of my support for the causal account. If anything,
I favour the idea that causal direction is reducible to temporal direction,
and not the other way around.52 However, for the presentist — who is
unable to make use of a topological account of preferred temporal direc-
tion and so must reduce time’s apparent direction to some other tempo-
rally asymmetric phenomenon — the causal account may seem promis-
ing. In fact, as I am now going to argue, the presentist account of time is
entirely incompatible with the causal account of temporal direction, and
presentism is in serious trouble as a result.
Essentially, the problem is presentism’s (well known) inability to deal
in any satisfactory way with transtemporal relations53 — and causation,
50. See Huemer and Kovitz (2003), and Rosenberg (1975).
51. I have not touched on the possibility of mutual causation, or causal loops, for in-
stance.
52. On the assumption that time has an objective orientation.
53. This is a point we touched on earlier, when looking at the presentist’s inability to
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as we usually understand it, is just such a transtemporal relation. Take,
Davidson’s (1967: 691) example, ‘the flood caused the famine’, for in-
stance. Here it is clear — and if it is not clear then we can specify
things such that it is — that the flood occurs at a different time to the
famine. Now, supposing that the famine exists at present (ignoring for
the moment any problems that the presentist might have with extended
events), then the flood does not exist at present. Further, according to the
presentist’s ontology, not only does the flood (a concrete entity) not exist
at present, it does not exist simpliciter — and so it is hard to see how the
flood could have caused anything at all.
Presentism’s trouble with transtemporal relations is general, rather
than specific, and so is not restricted to causation. The general problem
can be captured by the following inconsistent triad:
(1) There are transtemporal relations.
(2) For a relation to exist all of its relata must exist.
(3) Presentism is the correct theory of time.
The inconsistency arises because presentism appears to be unable to
support the relata that (2) claims are a necessary condition for the exis-
tence of transtemporal relations: those relations that hold between differ-
ent times, or objects at different times. Presentism makes space, or more
precisely allows time, for only one concrete moment (the present mo-
ment) and those concrete objects that are temporally present, and so has
nowhere to place non-present concrete relata. This is not a problemwhen
we consider wholly present relations, such as the mereological relations
that hold between a currently existing (momentary) object and its spatial
parts, but when we consider relations featuring one or more non-present
relata — such as the transtemporal causal relations that hold between
current crop production levels and past natural disasters — then it ap-
pears that we require the existence of some non-present objects or events
support extended experience.
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(in this case the past disasters).54 And presentism’s ontology is not rich
enough to support them.
The general version of the argument becomes specific when we sub-
stitute (1) for a positive existence claim about some particular type of
transtemporal relation — (1*), that there are transtemporal causal rela-
tions, for instance; or (1**), that there are transtemporal mereological re-
lations holding between the earlier and latter parts of an extended expe-
rience.
In fact, many of the classic problems that presentism faces can be un-
derstood as specific cases of the general problem of transtemporal rela-
tions. Take the ‘truth-maker problem’, for example:
The truth-maker principle roughly states that whenever a
statement (or other appropriate representational entity) is true
(or false), there is something about the world that makes that
statement true (or false). That, for example, the statement ‘it
rained today’ is true only if, in fact, it rained today. Here the
statement ‘it rained today’ is the holder of the truth property,
or the truth-bearer; and the way the world is, that it did or did
not rain today, is the thing that grounds the truth or falsity
of the statement, the truth-maker. Between the truth-bearer
and the truth-maker stands a grounding or in virtue of or truth-
making relation. This relation is asymmetrical, so that while it
is the case that the statement ‘it rained today’ is true (or false)
because of the way that the world is, it is not the case that it
rained today (or that it didn’t rain) because the statement that
‘it rained today’ is true (or false). The truth-maker principle
combines the awareness that the truth of a statement is not
wholly intrinsic to that statement, with the intuition that it is
the world that makes true the statement, and not (contra John
I) the true statement that makes the world. The truth-maker
54. Other transtemporal relations might include the transtemporal biological relations
that stand between you and your ancestors; the transtemporal personhood relations that
hold between your present self and your past self; transtemporal spatial relations, i.e.
relations of objects in motion; transtemporal same-party relations that hold between your
current prime minister, or president, and a past prime minister or president, and so on.
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principle is often thought to cause trouble for presentism be-
cause it seems that presentism has no way of providing truth-
makers for past-tensed truth-bearing statements like ‘it rained
last week’. In other words, no truth-making relation is able to
stand between a present truth-bearer and a past truth-maker.
And, as such, presentism is unable to account for truths about
the past.
Notice though, that by itself there is nothing internal to the truth-
maker principle that renders it incompatible with presentism. Instead,
the difficulty is caused by a tacit acceptance of the correspondence the-
ory of truth— roughly the view that the truth of a statement is defined by
that statement’s agreement, or correspondence, with the world— combined
with presentism’s inability to deal successfully with transtemporal relations.
This becomes particularly obvious if we substitute the correspondence
theory of truth for a pragmatist theory of truth where what it is for a
truth, S, to be true, is simply for it to be useful for a certain agent, or
agents, to believe that S is true. Here the truth-maker for any particular
truth is just the currently existing agent, or agents, and their beliefs, so
no transtemporal relations need be directly involved. With transtempo-
ral relations out of the picture, presentism and the truth-maker principle
can be jointly maintained, and truth-making poses no trouble for present-
ism at all. Presentism’s “problem with truth-making”, it turns out, has
very little to do with truth-making, and a lot to do with transtemporal
relations.
Returning to the general problem, what are the presentists to do?
They cannot reject (3) and remain presentists, so must reject either (1)
or (2) — but both seem obviously (even commonsensically) true. (2), I
think, is non-negotiable. Relating, by standing between, is what a relation
does — it is what defines it. A relation cannot stand between things that
do not exist.55 The only option, then, is for the presentist to reject (1), that
there are transtemporal relations. But the cost is exceedingly high.
55. To my knowledge Mark Hinchliff is the only presentist who rejects (2). See Hincliff
(1996).
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In denying that there are transtemporal relations we may have to
deny causation, and with it, the vast majority of human knowledge. I
might well think that today’s flood was caused by yesterday’s storm, or
that today’s tiredness was caused by last night’s lack of sleep, but if there
are no transtemporal relations then I amwrong. For today’s flood to have
been caused by yesterday’s storm, a transtemporal causal relation would
have to hold between yesterday’s storm and today’s flood. Similarly, for
today’s tiredness to be caused by last night’s lack of sleep, a transtem-
poral causal relation would have to hold between last night’s sleep and
today’s tiredness. But if (1) is false then there are no transtemporal causal
relations, and if there are no transtemporal causal relations then no such
relation can hold between yesterday’s storm and today’s flood, or be-
tween yesterday’s lack of sleep and today’s tiredness. The same goes
for any other supposed knowledge involving transtemporal relations —
art and science become pretty much pointless endeavours. Denying (1)
means denying knowledge of musical tempo (there are no transtempo-
ral tempo relations that hold between non-simultaneous musical notes);
it means denying knowledge of biological development (there are no
transtemporal development relations that hold between the earlier and
later stages of an organism); and it means denying knowledge of motion
(there are no transtemporal spatial relations that hold between an object’s
position at one time and its position at another time). But surely this re-
sult is absurd: we do know about musical tempo, we do know about
biological development, and we do know about motion.
Things are even worse if we accept a causal theory of knowledge plus
some additional plausible premises about the cognitive generation of be-
liefs. A causal theory of knowledge states, among other things, that for S
to know that P, S’s belief in P must be caused (directly or indirectly) by
P. If we combine this with a denial of (1) and the thesis that no belief is
(actually) instantly caused, it seems probable that there is (and will be)
no human knowledge at all!

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The general problem should, I think, give pause to anyone tempted by
presentism. But what, specifically, does it mean for the direction of time?
Well, if causal relations are transtemporal relations, and presentists are
forced to reject transtemporal relations, then presentists are forced to re-
ject causal relations as well. And if there are no causal relations, then
causation cannot be used to explain the direction of time.
Bourne (2006: 109-110), faced with the problems that transtemporal
relations generate for presentism, recommends that presentists deny that
causation involves such. He argues that this is not as radical as it may
first sound, as many accounts of causation do not take causal statements
to require transtemporal relations in the first place.56 His reasoning is
simple: causation is essential, and any theory that is forced to deny its
existence is in a very poor position indeed. I agree; but while Bourne’s
suggestion may save causation for the presentist, his path is not open to
those who wish to ground temporal anisotropy in causal asymmetry. If
causation is not a transtemporal relation, then it cannot give direction to
time. For while a causal account of temporal direction must not define
cause and effect in terms of earlier and later (to do so would be circular),
it must still be the case that causes and their effects are temporally stag-
gered. Because if they are not temporally staggered, if cause and effect are
simultaneous— as presentism seems to require — then causation is not a
temporally asymmetric phenomenon. And if causation is not a temporally
asymmetric phenomenon, then it is not a viable candidate for explaining
the direction of time.57
56. The Humean account of causation, for instance.
57. It has been suggested to me that in some cases a cause and its effect might partially
overlap, without being wholly simultaneous or wholly separated. The thought here, I
take it, is that in such cases a cause and its effect will be, in a sense, temporally asymmet-
rical, but the causal relation will not be a transtemporal one due to the overlap between
the cause and its effect. Notice though, that for there to be a partial overlap between a
cause and its effect, both the cause and its effect must be temporally extended. Consider a
case of partial causal overlap, where the “cause” extends from T1 to T3 and its “effect”
extends from T2 to T4. We can ask if the earlier, non-overlapping part of the “cause”
(T1 to T2) contributes to the effect. If it does, then a transtemporal causal relation is
involved, and if it does not, then the earlier part of the “cause” is not a part of the cause
at all. In the same way, we can ask if the cause produces the later, non-overlapping
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But if causation cannot be presentism’s ultimate ontological ground for
the phenomenological arrow of time, and entropy cannot be presentism’s
ultimate ontological ground for the phenomenological arrow of time, and
topology cannot be presentism’s ultimate ontological ground for the phe-
nomenological arrow of time, then what can? I think the presentist is
out of options, and as it turns out, is simply unable to support any non-
psychological account for the phenomenological arrow of time. Present-
ism has failed common sense again, and in doing so has failed the moti-
vations for adopting it in the first place.
part of the “effect” (T3 to T4). If it does, then, again, a transtemporal causal relation is
involved, and if it does not, then that later part of the “effect” is not a part of the effect
at all. Therefore, either there is causal asymmetry and a causal transtemporal relation
is involved, or there is no causal asymmetry and causation is not a viable candidate for
explaining the direction of time.
Conclusion
Philosophy is seductive. When I started my university education I was
convinced that I was going to be a geologist. A single philosophy course,
taken on a whim, changed my mind completely. Philosophy was intoxi-
cating and provocative; it was a lot more fun than looking at rocks. Ini-
tially I was delighted by the abundance of ideas that philosophy offered,
and was not at all concerned if some of those ideas seemed a little fan-
ciful or detached from reality. Over the years though, I have come to
long for the rock-solid common sense that one finds in geology, and have
occasionally considered returning to the field — if only to have a good
collection of stones to kick while making refutations.58
If philosophy is seductive, then presentism is doubly seductive. It is
a philosophical theory that appears, at least at first sight, to rest upon a
solid foundation of common sense. As Trenton Merricks sees it:
Presentism is the common-sense view, and its rivals merit an
incredulous stare. (2007: 140)
But, as I have argued in this thesis, presentism’s appearance is mis-
leading; it is a siren’s song, and we should ignore its call. Far from being
supported by common sense, presentism has proven to be antithetical to
58. ‘After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop
Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that everything
in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is
not true, it is impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with which Johnson
answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded
from it, “I refute it thus”’ (Boswell, 1791/1998).
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it. For this reason, presentists should abandon presentism. It is present-
ism, not its rivals, that deserves an incredulous stare.

In the first chapter I introduced the presentism/eternalism debate and
defended its legitimacy. I also noted presentism’s uncontested status as
the common sense theory of time, and the resulting intractability of the
presentism/eternalism debate. Initially I defined ‘presentism’ and ‘eter-
nalism’ using the standard existence-oriented definitions one commonly
finds in the literature. However, in the process of investigating Dorato’s
‘no contrast class’ argument— an argument which purports to show that
the presentism/eternalism debate is not genuine — it became clear that
the standard definitions engender confusion, and that the debate could
be improved by the introduction of new definitions. After dismissing
Dorato’s argument, I suggested that definitions based on the notion of
concreteness were to be preferred, as they capture the richness of the
presentism/eternalism debate without augmentation.
In the second chapter I highlighted the central position that common
sense has played, and continues to play, in philosophy. I detailed the
wide variety of interconnected notions that fall under common sense’s
general umbrella, and noted common sense’s tripartite role as a founda-
tion, a motivator, and a touchstone. My primary interest here was to em-
phasise presentism’s common sense status, and to reinforce the impor-
tance of the motivations that underlie presentism. To illustrate the crit-
ical role that presentism’s motivations play in sustaining the view, I in-
troduced Putnam’s famous argument from special relativity. I suggested
that the fact that presentists remain largely unmoved by this argument is
a direct result of the argument’s failure to engage with presentism’s un-
derlying motivations. I concluded, therefore, that for real progress in the
presentism/eternalism debate to occur, presentism’s motivations would
need to be fully taken into account. Direct arguments against presentism
were unlikely to move presentists, so such tactics were pointless. Instead,
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it needed to be shown that presentism was incompatible with the moti-
vations generally taken to support it — in other words, that presentism
was incompatible with common sense. This was the task I undertook in
chapters three and four.
In chapter three I started with the observation that the present mo-
ment could be thought of in two ways: either as instantaneous, or as ex-
tended. I suggested that presentism was committed to the former, rather
than the latter, but argued that presentism’s commitment to a single con-
crete instant rendered it unable to support extended experience. I ar-
gued that the existence of extended experience necessitates the existence
of temporal extension, and that presentism, with its minimal ontology, is
unable to provide this extension. Since nothing is more commonsensical
than the fact that we experience things, and since presentism is unable
support these experiences, it can only be concluded that presentism is
not the common sense view of time that we thought it was.
In chapter four I provided a second argument to the same ultimate
conclusion — a backup argument, if you will. But this time, rather than
taking extended experience as the non-negotiable feature of reality, I took
one of presentism’s own commitments: that there is an ontologically
grounded temporal arrow. I asked how presentism could account for
that arrow, and explored the two options that seemed most promising:
entropy and causation. I argued that entropy was unable to do the job
required of it, due to the statistical nature of the second law of thermo-
dynamics. I also argued that for the presentist to make use of an entropic
account of temporal direction, they would need to be able to construct an
entropic gradient out of multiple time slices; but that due to their mini-
mal ontological resources, they would be unable to do so. By and large,
my criticisms of the entropic account of temporal direction were as ap-
plicable to eternalism as to presentism, so the loss for presentism was not
great. However, in the next section I looked at causation, which eternal-
ism has no trouble with, and argued that presentism is unable to make
use of it either. Causation, I argued, requires transtemporal relations -- as
does extended experience, as do entropic gradients – and presentism is
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simply unable to supply them. But since presentism is unable to supply
them, presentism is unable to make use of the causal account of temporal
direction. And since presentism cannot explain time’s arrow by way of
entropy or by way of causation, it looks like presentism cannot explain
time’s arrow at all.

In the end presentism is unable to support either everyday experience
or a preferred temporal direction. It has failed common sense and, in
doing so, has proven itself to be at odds with its own underlying motiva-
tions. Without common sense backing it, there seems to be no reason to
continue to support presentism, so presentism should be dismissed. It’s
about time.
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